Another excellent report Rocko. These recent goal concessions and blame attribution pieces are highlighting Kayal’s recent play for me and it’s quite concerning in my opinion. Hard to explain but, to me, it seems he’s playing without the necessary discipline. He’s doing the same running as ever but it’s silly on occasion and he’s not working hard enough to get back into defensive positions.
Like, what the fuck was he doing for the first goal? He had Lafferty pinned in the corner and he needed to just stand up and jockey him. It’s almost as if he’s playing in a petulant or impatient manner the way he decided to have an unnecessary nibble and allowed himself to be rolled and the resulting cross to come in. Obviously Wilson should have dealt with it but still…
Just generally, he appears to me to be running around and almost doing his own thing, getting caught ahead of the ball when the opposition have it and not being concerned with our defensive shape and getting back goalside. Same thing in Madrid for the second goal and not sure what he was doing for the fourth on Sunday though, as you say, we can maybe make allowance for the fact we were chasing the game and down to 10 men.
If I was being very harsh I’d have given Kayal some blame on the third goal too. He makes a run beyond Hooper when the pass is already on its way to being intercepted and makes the decision then to press Papac which is the wrong call. In fairness he does turn around and sprint back so, like the first goal, I don’t think it’s really just an attitude issue in terms of not putting in the work. But he is undisciplined in his defending.
Actually another point I forgot to make on the first goal is that before the throw-in was taken Kayal had to go behind the Celtic goal - think he had something in his eye or something like that. The referee stopped play but nobody took the decision to go and mark Lafferty in that time which I thought was odd. He jogged back on, ran over to Lafferty and then got turned. It may have been the fact that he was rushing back into play that meant he was over-enthusiastic but either way he didn’t recognise the real danger.
Great post Rocko. Again though, I lay the blame of goals conceded at set pieces with the coaching team. It’s clear we don’t practice these situations on the training ground and are not organised in the slightest, although I understand your reasoning to apportion blame.
Forster was horrendous for the third goal and is a dreadful keeper. I think he will be exposed alot more this season and I really don’t think he’s any better than Zaluska.
Kayal seems to have got his act together since my last post on this thread. I thought his attitude was suspect in Madrid and away to the huns.
But this thread bump is for Rocko really. Seeing as this thread is to pin players for concessions and you don’t make allowances for refereeing or management decisions, how the fuck are you going to approach last night’s goal? 100% blame to Hooper for standing upright and doing nothing?
A decent defensive showing against Udinese during the week, following on from a fairly unconvincing clean sheet against Inverness last weekend, gave hope that Celtic’s defensive fragility might be a thing of the past. That short-lived bubble was well and truly burst in a shambolic rearguard display at Hearts.
Almost an hour into the game and Celtic had survived a few nervous moments in the first half but finally looked to be settling into control of the game. The midfield were on top, the strikers were frustrated but at least involved, the main concern was whether the clean sheet could be kept intact. Huub Stevens has a phrase for his coaching philosophy in German football - “Die Null muss stehen” (the zero must stay). It’s a cliché now and often ridiculed for its simplicity and negativity but it can be a useful demand to make of teams that are conceding sloppy goals frequently. In the aftermath of today’s defeat there have been plentiful calls for Lennon’s head on a plate. He still has time to save his job and to save Celtic’s season but that must start with individual and collective responsibility to take pride in keeping the opposition at bay.
Goal One: Skacel - left footed drive
Hearts had a throw-in on their right hand side roughly 15 metres from the goalline. It was almost an identical situation to the area where the first Rangers goal was created from in the recent derby. A benign situation that shouldn’t trouble either an organised or a committed defence (not both, either trait would have prevented a goal here) and it certainly shouldn’t be exposing a defence who had conceded a crucial goal from a similar position a couple of weeks ago.
The first thing to note is the complete lack of organisation in the defending. When Hamill is taking the throw-in at first he only has Black to aim at. Kris Commons is marking the Hearts midfielder and follows his initial run. The throw doesn’t go to Black but if Hamill opted for that ball he could easily give it and get it back in time and space because El Kaddouri and Wanyama are employing a watching brief from a safe distance. Most teams don’t mark the thrower directly these days but he should still be the primary responsibility for one player and being closer than 20 metres away would help.
A couple of seconds later as the throw-in is being taken Celtic have been shaken out of their slumber but the marking is now worse if anything. Commons, having tracked Black’s run, is now between the thrower and Black and he continues to ignore his man for the remainder of the time until the goal is scored despite Black taking up a reasonably dangerous position later on. El Kaddouri has picked up the run of Mrowiec and is in a reasonable position goalside of the Polish midfielder. Wanyama looks very casual marking nobody in particular - though to be fair his gait suggests his attitude is more relaxed or uninterested than he actually was.
When Mrowiec returns the ball to Hamill the effort to close down a potential cross is too late. Both El Kaddouri and Wanyama advance towards the thrower but neither has enough time to make up the gap because of their distant starting positions. This affords Hamill the chance to return the ball into the box, albeit with a percentage cross that should hardly cause much trouble.
As Hamill lofts the ball into the box there are ten Celtic players within 25 metres of the goal. That’s fairly conservative positioning in anyone’s language and should be more than sufficient to cope with the seven from Hearts in the same rough area. The marking at this stage is clear. Mulgrew is picking up the front post area. Majstorovic is looking after Stevenson, Matthews has Templeton and Ki has Skacel. The yellow X below marks the area where Templeton touches the cross, the yellow Y is where Skacel shoots from.
The hang-time on the cross means that there is plenty of time for movement before the ball reaches its destination but only Hearts players use this time to change their positions. Ki was no more than three metres from Skacel (goalside) when Hamill hits the ball (in the above image) but manages to find himself a good 15 metres away by the time Skacel pulls the trigger. The x’s in the below image represent the starting positions from both players when Hamill fires in the cross.
Majstorovic followed the flight of the ball in the air to move alongside Matthews onto Templeton but neither he nor Matthews recognises the threat from Skacel looping outside and neither manages to force their way into a position to challenge for the ball aerially. The touch from Templeton is terrific but he’s not a player with fantastic physical strength and the failure of both Majstorovic and Matthews to even contest the cross is dismal.
When Skacel hits his shot first time he is 8 or 9 yards wide of the far post (the 6 yard box is 6 yards wide of the goalposts as well as being 6 yards in depth) and about 11 yards from goal. The shot is well struck first-time but it 's not a thunderbolt. At first glance it might appear to rocket past Forster into the far corner but repeat viewings indicate it passed by Forster at roughly 60% of the width of the goal from the near post - less than 5 yards from that post. The final image below is a view of the ball crossing the goal-line with all players airbrushed out including the goalkeeper. It’s not asking much of a goalkeeper to get a hand to that sort of shot - at the very minimum.
El Kaddouri: 2% Has a chance to block the initial cross but he’s left himself too much to do thanks to a timid starting position.
Wanyama: 3% Takes no responsibility at the throw-in. If he’s not marking a receiver then he needs to be the first man blocking any return to the thrower. He’s too slow to react to the danger and allows the cross to come in.
Ki: 40% Doesn’t pick up the run of Skacel at all. The cross isn’t dangerous in itself but Skacel recognises the possibilities and Ki doesn’t see them or doesn’t react to them.
Majstorovic: 5% Unclear why he follows the ball over to Templeton if he’s not going to attack it in the air. Matthews has remained goalside of Templeton and though he’s not going to win the header the only assistance Majstorovic can provide is to win the ball in the air or to win the second ball. Majstorovic’s movement is more down to ball-watching and ball-following than any anticipation of danger.
Matthews:5% Like Majstorovic he doesn’t compete for the ball in the air and it is Templeton who creates the goal with his deft touch. He reacts to Skacel peeling off behind once the ball is laid off but better communication with his centre back and he should have been able to move onto the danger man before the ball is even played there.
Forster: 45% Ultimately this is a reasonably straightforward shot for a goalkeeper to deal with. The graphics illustrate how central the ball was when it crossed the goal-line and it was obviously even closer to the midpoint of the goal when it passed by the keeper’s left hand.
Goal Two: Stevnson - right footed finish
While the first goal demonstrated one repeated failing of Celtic - a lack of organisation from set pieces, the second was another old favourite - the hopeful hoof downfield creating panic.
Celtic have switched to playing three at the back so there’s no additional cover to cover any lapses at the back. Majstorovic, having won a header against Obua is slightly upfield, leaving Wilson and Mulgrew behind to deal with Templeton and Stevenson.
Grainger launches a long ball forward from his own half and immediately exposes a recurring problem Celtic have in dealing with long balls over the top. The ball first bounces inside the Celtic penalty area (having travelled from the half-way line) but Forster elects to backpedal rather than come and meet the ball. Templeton, Stevenson and Mark Wilson engage in a race to see who can get to the ball before it crosses the endline while Mulgrew jogs back half-heartedly and Forster retreats to his goal-line. The first time anyone gets a touch to Grainger’s ball is when Templeton plays it almost on the line, in other words he has travelled 35 or 40 metres to retrieve a ball quicker than Forster thinks he can get to it. Either the goalkeeper misjudged the flight of the ball or he is uncertain about covering his penalty area. The number of similar situations this season and last season suggests the latter is the case.
Even when Templeton manages to keep the ball in the situation is dangerous but not critical. Stevenson is 6 yards from the endline and 16 yards from the front post. In other words the angle he might attack from is accute and both Forster and Mulgrew are in relatively good positions to block his route to goal.
The flick from Templeton causes even more hesitation and uncertainty in the defence. The ball travels towards the edge of the 6 yard box, the X in the above image marks the spot where Stevenson somehow manages the next touch. In other words the ball has travelled roughly 15 yards and Stevenson has moved 12 yards to reach a ball at a point 6 yards from the Celtic goalkeeper.
The below image illustrates just why Forster can’t get to the ball before Stevenson and it’s all about reaction time - a quality that is obviously vitally important in a goalkeeper. The image below is two merged images taken a second apart from the same camera angle. The faded image is the earlier screenshot. [There is a small bit of extra zoom in the second image, hence the minor distortion around the goal-line but effectively all that has moved between the two images is time]. The yellow lines between the two images illustrate the movement by Wilson, Templeton (off-pitch) and Mulgrew. There is no second image of Forster because he hasn’t moved at all towards the ball in that second after Templeton has flicked the ball inside.
The rest is reasonably straightforward for Hearts. Ian Black is out of picture for most of these images but is available for Stevenson should he wish to play the ball back to someone else. Mulgrew finds himself on the goal-line and can’t keep the shot out but a bit more effort earlier in the move and he would have had ample opportunity to intervene. Once Stevenson beats Forster to the ball though the game is up. He takes a touch away from goal and fires home easily. There is one more image below of Forster as the shot flies past him that is fairly damning. His body position is unconventional for a goalkeeper to say the least.
Culpability:
M Wilson: 10% Wilson is beaten too easily by a straight ball over the top. The fact that Stevenson (offside initially) is nearby is a distraction at first but when Templeton gets to the ball Wilson pauses and allows Stevenson to drift inside. With the Hearts winger facing the wrong way and moving the wrong way there was only one dangerous ball he could have played and Wilson should have been alive to that danger.
Mulgrew: 30% Far too slack in his pursuit of Templeton. He possible presumes the ball is going wide but that’s no excuse for a professional footballer and it’s his responsibility to get back with his man. In fact any sort of effort in his chase back and he’d be in position to intercept the flick back inside with minimum effort but he’s far too late to react and the danger becomes critical before he shows enough urgency.
Forster: 60% The first ball should be meat and drink to any goalkeeper. The ball travels 50 yards and Forster can’t travel 10 to catch it. Any ball, no matter how deft (and this was far from a precision pass by Grainger) from the other half of the pitch shouldn’t bounce in the Celtic penalty area. It’s unacceptable to allow that to happen.
The second ball exposes further hesitancy and a lack of sharpness and anticipation. Stevenson and the ball both travel twice the distance Forster needs to make up but either he reads the situation badly, is afraid of getting hurt or his reactions are simply too slow. The first is worrying but could be rectified. The other two are damning for a goalkeeper.
This is a wonderful thread indeed. No wonder there’s lads on the huddleboard printing it out to share among their friends.
I think Majstorovic and Matthews should take more blame for the first goal. That ball was hanging in the air for ages and NEEDED to be attacked and headed away by a defender showing some responsibility and determination. The fact that Templeton was allowed to take it down with his foot to lay off to Skacel defied belief. I wouldn’t pin that much of the blame on Ki and Forster. I take the point that the ball went past Forster close enough to the centre of the goal but it came through Matthews’ legs, as far as I recall. Those ones can be difficult - but it’s still the type of shot Boruc would have kept out perhaps. I think Ki would be within his rights to expect one of the defenders to attack the fucking ball.
The pictures for the second goal are damning for a few players, particularly Forster. Is he handcuffed to the near post or what? He should have come out to claim the initial ball into the box and he should have been out to collect the backheel too. It’s ridiculous to think that Stevenson’s first touch was actually inside Forster’s 6-yard box. Mulgrew play at the goal was disappointingly lax too. It actually reminds me of his own goal at Caley Thistle at the end of last season. He didn’t appreciate that there was danger until it was too late and never got himself in the correct position to deal with it.
I’m happy to concede that Forster may have too much blame for the first goal and Matthews and Majstorovic too little. I think Ki needed to track the run of Skacel though, when you look at the movement of Black and Skacel in the pictures it’s noticeable just how static Celtic’s defenders are.
Thought Mulgrew had a good enough game yesterday but that was a brutal effort for the second goal and could have been 100% blame if it wasn’t for the ineptitude of others.
Another game, another series of incredible defensive calamities and three goals conceded to a struggling Kilmarnock team. Some of the mistakes were recurrences of lapses in previous weeks, others were new types of ineptitude invented on the day, but the common theme is an utter failure to take personal responsibility.
The defensive system at Celtic is well and truly broken. The players don't trust eachother. They are making (poor) decisions as individuals - not as a unit. Their basic skills are alarmingly poor. And they're disgracefully short on effort.
Goal One - Shields left-footed strike
The first goal was extremely similar to the http://www.thefreekick.com/blog/?p=2624]second goal against Hearts a fortnight ago. An innocuous looking long ball ripped the defence to shreds and while some players got back to retrieve the situation they made poor decisions. Others didn’t bother retreating at all.
There should be no danger from conceding a throw-in halfway inside the opposition half but when things are going badly this is the type of benign situation that can cause problems. The first image below shows just how much time Danny Buijs has to receive the throw-in and play the ball forward. It’s a bit far out to be apportioning blame to anyone (and it’s not clear who should be pressing anyway) but it’s indicative of the collective malaise throughout the Celtic team that Buijs is given a 10 yard radius directly from a throw-in from which to launch the ball forward.
When the ball is played forward, a number of repeated offences from this season are committed - all of which contribute to the most basic of tactics (the long ball over the top) once again causing ridiculous problems for the defence.
The positioning is fine before the ball is played. Majstorovic has stolen a yard or two to give himself extra room which has allowed Heffernan to move marginally ahead of Cha but it’s far from catastrophic.
A couple of seconds later and Heffernan has destroyed Majstorovic and Cha for pace but still the danger is limited. There are two Celtic defenders in prime positions to intervene (Cha and Majstorovic) with Mulgrew providing cover a little further over. Shields hasn’t even entered the frame yet.
The trajectory of the ball forward slows Heffernan down as expected and allows Cha to get back goalside. His initial instinct is to prevent any shooting opportunity for Heffernan which makes sense given the dangerous area where the striker picks up the ball and given the lack of support arriving from midfield. Cha’s aim is to slow the game down and allow his midfield and central defence time to deal with the late runners from midfield.
Majstorovic unfortunately has adopted a watching brief for this passage of play. He has continued to run back to the box following Cha but he seems unaware of the danger posed by support runners. His sole interest is Heffernan and the ball - when it is apparent that Cha is in reasonable control of that situation he still fails to switch his attention to the new danger. This lack of decisive intervention is possibly a lack of awareness or more likely a failure to take responsibility that permeates throughout the entire team.
The yellow X in the two images below marks the spot where Shields took his first touch after Heffernan rolled it back to him. It wouldn’t have taken much movement or much anticipation from Majstorovic to prevent the ball from being played into the only area that Kilmarnock could cause problems from.
The real story of this goal is the lack of tracking from midfield however. The last image above shows Kelly and Shields in acres of space, having left Forrest and Kayal for dead. Forrest realises he has been caught out and sprints after Kelly to try and rescue the situation. Kayal doesn’t interrupt his slow jog for anyone or anything.
The (grainy) image below shows how close Kayal is to Shields when the ball is played over their heads. Unlike Forrest and Kelly it is immediately obvious who has responsibility for tracking Shields and Kayal is in a perfect position to do so. Kayal ignores one of the most fundamental tenets of defending - to always assume the worst. However this isn’t just a failure to react, the decision not to track the run of Shields is lazy and negligent.
As the ball is played back to Shields by Heffernan, Kayal is a good 10 to 15 metres behind his man. The referee has also gained about 10 metres on Kayal over this time - that’s not just switching off momentarily, only a conscious decision not to bother tracking back can explain the gap between Kayal and Shields by the time the goal is scored.
Kayal: 70% - A complete lack of effort from a player who has worn the Celtic armband in the very recent past. Not the first time he has failed to track a run this season but this was the most glaring example of this deficiency yet,
Majstorovic: 30% - He had the opportunity to prevent the pass from Heffernan but either failed to see it or didn’t react in time. He didn’t have a big danger area to cover and a couple of steps towards the runners from midfield would have averted the danger completely.
Goal Two - Shields left-footed strike
Another throw-in for Kilmarnock near halfway and another goal conceded. Obviously there was still plenty of time to defend properly after some disorganisation at the throw-in but it’s these small repetitive issues that are continuing to cause Celtic problems.
Harkins makes a run across the Celtic back four to receive a long throw-in midway inside the Celtic half. Given Celtic’s general rigidity to playing one centre back on the left and one on the right it’s surprising that Mulgrew tracks this run all the way across and so ends up on the right touchline. This may have been a conscious decision by the player himself, an instruction from management or just a reaction to events as they unfolded but the upshot of this is that both centre backs are within 10 metres of the touchline and Matthews is all alone in a central area.
Mulgrew managed to get a toe on the ball eventually and it breaks between Forrest and Kayal who leave it for eachother. Kilmarnock recover and it’s played inside to Shields - pressed by Kayal. The booking he picked up seconds previously may impact on Kayal’s aggression because he is timid in his challenge of Shields who skips away from him easily.
As Shields runs at Cha there is only one Kilmarnock player offering any outlet to him. There is nobody on an overlap to distract Cha, nobody showing inside to occupy Ki and nobody at the far post. Heffernan is the only possible pass that Shields can play but because nobody has to mark Heffernan, nobody does.
From the above image it is clear already that neither Matthews nor Majstorovic is paying enough attention to Heffernan. Mulgrew and Ki are in safe, conservative positions, understandably relying on Cha to block the cross or either of the two players at the edge of the box to deal with the threat from Heffernan.
When Shields does play the cross inside the communication between Majstorovic and Matthews is non-existent. Majstorovic is watching Heffernan from the original throw-in so it’s a terrible error of judgement or lapse in concentration to allow Heffernan behind him. He is normally expecting Mulgrew to occupy that area - who would then pick up the striker - but Mulgrew is out in front of Majstorovic. A trusting centre back partnership would recognise this danger and because Mulgrew is blocking the near post, Majstorovic would adjust and take up the centre of the goal. He holds his ground as though Mulgrew is behind him and the result is disastrous.
Matthews doesn’t cover himself in glory either. He opts for an offside appeal - which probably should have been awarded - but allows Heffernan to drift two yards goalside of him. He has a full view of the danger but takes the easiest possible route to escape it, by playing offside, when matching the run of Heffernan would prevent the goal.
Majstorovic: 35% - A lack of awareness of the danger lurking behind him. He didn’t compensate for Mulgrew’s position in his decision-making and was only concerned with the ball and trying to cut out the cross.
Matthews:55% - Could have expected Majstorovic to deal with Heffernan as he was marking him initially, but had plenty of time to realise that wasn’t happening and didn’t react. Made no effort to get goalside of Heffernan and took the easy way out.
Cha: 5% - Undone by a decent piece of skill by Shields but with no threat outside and Shields at a jogging pace, he should have been capable of blocking the cross.
Forster: 5% - Not the most dynamic goalkeeping you’ll ever see. When Shields plays the cross, Heffernan is 16/17 yards from goal. He plays it just outside the 6 yard box meaning he has travelled 10 yards or so to meet the cross. Forster is a yard from his line and his anticipation isn’t good enough to advance the required 6 yards to meet the ball.
Goal Three - Fowler Lob
The third goal is depressingly straightforward. Bizarrely, it’s another throw-in, another long ball over the top and a calamitous mistake from Charlie Mulgrew this time.
The mistake from Mulgrew is all too obvious and hardly needs explaining here. He takes about 15 metres and over 2 seconds between his first effort to control the ball and his decision to play the ball back. In that time Harkins has applied real pressure, but it’s the run of Fowler that causes all the problems.
There are a couple of factors to consider in Mulgrew’s defence. Firstly it seems apparent that he got no call from his team-mates. This was a telegraphed backpass, Fowler read it obviously. Forster never convinces on his communication but he should have been roaring at Mulgrew to play the ball to touch.
Secondly, both Majstorovic and Matthews had the opportunity to make Mulgrew’s life easier but didn’t avail of it. The concept of a centre back partnership seems to be alien to this Celtic side but it’s Majstorovic who is marking Harkins initially so when Harkins sprints on to apply pressure to Mulgrew why doesn’t Majstorovic get goalside in case of any errors?
Finally, there is no escaping the fact that it’s the wrong decision to play the ball back and it’s dreadfully executed. Yet questions remain about Forster’s positioning. When Fowler takes his first (and only) touch on the ball he is about 14 yards out and 6 yards wide of the near post. Forster doesn’t seem to have anticipated the danger at all as he is still only about 10 yards from his goal-line when Fowler takes his shot.
In slight mitigation of Forster those measurements are a small bit misleading because Fowler delays taking his first touch and is effectively in control of the ball for a few yards before his first touch. The question still remains as to why he wasn’t out at the edge of his box for the backpass though, Forster has never been confident in his kicking and seemed to favour giving himself room over bailing out his centre back.
Blame:
Mulgrew: 80% - Not helped by his team-mates but the error to gift the ball to Fowler was Mulgrew’s and Mulgrew’s alone.
Matthews: 5% - Never makes up the ground on Fowler that might see him in a position to help out if Mulgrew messes up the backpass. A failure of anticipation and judgement.
Majstorovic: 10% - Unlike Matthews, Majstorovic didn’t even seem to see the danger. The ball wasn’t there for him to win so he took no interest in the passage of play that followed. A good centre back would help out his partner. An experienced international like Majstorovic should be far more honest in his endeavours than that.
Forster: 5% - Gets the benefit of the doubt on communication but should have been roaring at Mulgrew. Regardless he didn’t react to the situation and he should have been further off his line, having seen Mulgrew in trouble.
A terrific European performance from a massively understrength Celtic team last night delivered a welcome three points. The cause was not helped by the disastrous concession of an early goal that echoed a couple of familiar themes in the season thus far.
Celtic have conceded 21 goals in 19 competitive games, 4 of which have been surrendered in the opening 5 minutes of a match. That's 20% of the goals conceded in the first 6% of games - a trend that's just too regular even in this small sample size to reflect mere coincidence. Three of those early concessions have been in European games and for a squad short on confidence it's leaving an awful lot to do to fall behind so early against the likes of Rennes, Atletico Madrid and Sion. By way of contrast, despite scoring 35 goals over the same number of games the team has only managed to score twice in the first 5 minutes. Whether it's a physical or mental problem that results in the players getting caught cold frequently, it requires urgent attention.
The second familiar theme from the goal conceded was the fact it came from a corner kick. This was the fourth goal Celtic have conceded from a corner kick this season, all of which have come from the same side of the pitch. Three of those were headed directly into the net from the corner - all of which were outswinging right-footed corners that were aimed to the central zone between the 6 yard box and the penalty box. The inevitable debate about zonal marking will resume once again but a short-term emergency solution to add a fourth zonal marker just behind the central player would seem an obvious stopgap.
Culpability
So, other than blaming the system (which needs to take some responsibility obviously) the actual individual failings are familiar from similar investigations into the goals conceded against Rangers and Atletico Madrid.
Facing the corner Celtic are lined up in a familiar formation. The trio of primary defenders marking zones are Loovens at the front post (yellow zone), Majstorovic in the centre (blue zone) and Samaras at the back post (red zone). Wanyama has assumed Ki’s role in front of the near post, and Cha and Stokes are competing with the runners from the penalty spot - at least that’s the intention.
The eventual goalscorer (Mangane) is right on Cha’s shoulder and directly in the centre of the goal. Majstorovic is half-way between the centre of the goal and the back post as the ball is struck - yet both Cha and Majstorovic are completely sucked in by the flight of the outswinging corner and both end up in front of the ball when Mangane heads it home. The yellow X in the below image marks the point where Mangane makes contact with the ball - Majstorovic is in a decent starting position to go and attack it if he manages to time his run and jump reasonably.
The next image below illustrates just how much Majstorovic was attracted to the ball, when he’d have been in a far better position to attack the corner by simply holding his ground or moving a couple of yards towards the ball. [Stokes and Kayal have been removed from this picture to allow the two images of Majstorovic to appear unobstructed].
While the overall defensive system at corners needs serious work, once again it’s the failure of a centre back to compete aerially for the ball that has undone the team. And once again it’s not a case of Majstorovic losing out to a player who outjumps him - as with Loovens in Madrid and at Ibrox, it’s a simple misjudgement of the flight of the ball and the centre back has ended up under the ball. That sort of continued failure at the basics of defending will result in a stream of goals being conceded regardless of what system is employed.
Some blame must be accepted by Cha and Stokes for failing to even impede the run of Mangane towards the ball. Cha is closer to the Senegalese defender when the corner is taken and could certainly be expected to present a greater obstacle to Mangane than simply stepping out of his way. While Cha can point to the runners to the near post attracting his attention, Stokes can justify his flat-footedness by claiming that the two runners at the back post were his responsibility, again with some justification, but to allow the chief opposing aerial threat a clear run and jump at the ball is a failure on an individual, as well as systemic, level.
Blame:
Majstorovic: 65% - There is no getting away from the fact that he is best placed to deal with the cross and the ball could not be more clearly in his zone. If he does his job correctly then there won’t be a goal conceded, though surely it’s time for Lennon to look at deploying a second body in that central zone that has coughed up three near-identical goals from corners so far this season,http://www.thefreekick.com/blog/?p=2583] as suggested previously .
Cha: 20% - Cha is in perfect position to obstruct the run of Mangane from the outset. Heading isn’t the Korean defender’s strongpoint but he doesn’t even need to get off the ground to cause a nuisance of himself in this situation. He is too easily distracted by the run across the front - into an area already guarded by Loovens and Ki.
Stokes: 15% - Not as directly responsible as Cha because he has a greater number of bodies behind him to deal with but once he realises the ball is falling short of him you’d expect some sort of belated reaction towards the ball. Probably can’t do enough at that stage to prevent a goal, but a natural defender (in short supply at Celtic unfortunately) would make some sort of attempt.
nonetheless