If you could read my mind is a belter
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RIP. They became a bit of a soft rock, Coldplayesque stadium/arena band as time went by but Snow Patrol had some genuinely cracking songs back in the day.
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Hopefully he finally gets back to space now. To infinity and beyond
Bobby Sands will be inconsolable.
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Back Home in Derry (Bobby Sands)
To the air of The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald
In 1803 we sailed out to sea
Out from the sweet town of Derry
For Australia bound if we didnât all drown
The marks of our fetters we carried
In the rusty iron chains we cried for our weanâs
Our good women we left in sorrow
As the main sails unfurled, our curses we hurled
At the English and thoughts of tomorrow
At the mouth of the Foyle, bid farwell to the soil
As down below decks we were lying
OâDoherty screamed, woken out of a dream
By a vision of bold Robert dying
The sun burned cruel as we dished out the gruel
Dan OâConnor was down with the fever
Sixty rebels today bound for Botany Bay
How many will reach their receiver?
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
I cursed them to hell, as our bow fought the swell
Our ship danced like a moth in the firelight
Wild horses rode high as the devil passed by
Taking souls to Hades by twilight
Five weeks out to sea, we were now forty-three
We buried our comrades each morning
In our own slime, we were lost in the time
Endless night without dawning
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
Van Diemenâs land is a hell for a man
To end out his whole life in slavery
Where the climate is raw and the gun makes the law
Neither wind nor rain care for bravery
Twenty years have gone by, Iâve ended my bond
My comradesâ ghosts walk behind me
A rebel I came, Iâm still the same
On the cold winterâs night you will find me
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
Oh-oh-oh-oh, oh, I wish I was back home in Derry
Thereâs no chorus in the Wreck of the Edmund FitzGerald which is one of the appealing things about the song.
The song was released in 1976 barely a year after the ship sank. I found difficult to believe that a ship of this size could sink in a lake as recently as this.
Awful song, no melody to it (wreckage of Edmund Fitzgerald, not back home in Derry).
I Donât Like Mondays by the Boomtown Rats was at number one less than six months after Brenda Ann Spencer opened fire on Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego on January 29th, 1979.
Any news events of the last few months that could propel somebody here to Top Of The Pops?
The lyrics kind of explain it.
not really, because theyre still not sure what happened
It broke deep. Took on water. Then capsized and split up when the cargo shifted as it hit the lake bed.
Itâs all in the song and the wreck has been dived to confirm.
thats a hypothesis
Hypotheses on the cause of sinking[edit]
Extreme weather and sea conditions play a role in all of the published hypotheses regarding Edmund Fitzgerald 's sinking, but they differ on the other causal factors.[101]
Waves and weather hypothesis[edit]
Weather map of November 10, 1975.
In 2005, NOAA and the NWS ran a computer simulation, including weather and wave conditions, covering the period from November 9, 1975, until the early morning of November 11.[102] Analysis of the simulation showed that two separate areas of high wind appeared over Lake Superior at 4:00 p.m. on November 10. One had speeds in excess of 43 knots (80 km/h; 49 mph) and the other winds in excess of 40 knots (74 km/h; 46 mph).[103] The southeastern part of the lake, the direction in which Edmund Fitzgerald was heading, had the highest winds. Average wave heights increased to near 19 feet (5.8 m) by 7:00 p.m., November 10, and winds exceeded 50 mph (43 kn; 80 km/h) over most of southeastern Lake Superior.[104]
Edmund Fitzgerald sank at the eastern edge of the area of high wind[105] where the long fetch, or distance that wind blows over water, produced significant waves averaging over 23 feet (7.0 m) by 7:00 p.m. and over 25 feet (7.6 m) at 8:00 p.m. The simulation also showed one in 100 waves reaching 36 feet (11 m) and one out of every 1,000 reaching 46 feet (14 m). Since the ship was heading east-southeastward, it is likely that the waves caused Edmund Fitzgerald to roll heavily.[106]
At the time of the sinking, the ship Arthur M. Anderson reported northwest winds of 57 mph (50 kn; 92 km/h), matching the simulation analysis result of 54 mph (47 kn; 87 km/h).[106] The analysis further showed that the maximum sustained winds reached near hurricane force of about 70 mph (61 kn; 110 km/h) with gusts to 86 miles per hour (75 kn; 138 km/h) at the time and location where Edmund Fitzgerald sank.[104]
Rogue wave hypothesis[edit]
A group of three rogue waves, often called âthree sisters,â[107] was reported in the vicinity of Edmund Fitzgerald at the time she sank.[35][108] The âthree sistersâ phenomenon is said to occur on Lake Superior and refers to a sequence of three rogue waves forming that are one-third larger than normal waves. The first wave introduces an abnormally large amount of water onto the deck. This water is unable to fully drain away before the second wave strikes, adding to the surplus. The third incoming wave again adds to the two accumulated backwashes, quickly overloading the deck with too much water.[35]
Captain Cooper of Arthur M. Anderson reported that his ship was âhit by two 30 to 35 foot seas about 6:30 p.m., one burying the aft cabins and damaging a lifeboat by pushing it right down onto the saddle. The second wave of this size, perhaps 35 foot, came over the bridge deck.â[107] Cooper went on to say that these two waves, possibly followed by a third, continued in the direction of Edmund Fitzgerald and would have struck about the time she sank.[108] This hypothesis postulates that the âthree sistersâ compounded the twin problems of Edmund Fitzgerald 's known list and her lower speed in heavy seas that already allowed water to remain on her deck for longer than usual.[107]
The âEdmund Fitzgeraldâ episode of the 2010 television series Dive Detectives features the wave-generating tank of the National Research Councilâs Institute for Naval Technology in St. Johnâs, and the tankâs simulation of the effect of a 17-meter (56 ft) rogue wave upon a scale model of Edmund Fitzgerald. The simulation indicated such a rogue wave could almost completely submerge the bow or stern of the ship with water, at least temporarily.[109]
Cargo-hold flooding hypothesis[edit]
The July 26, 1977, USCG Marine Casualty Report suggested that the accident was caused by ineffective hatch closures.[2] The report concluded that these devices failed to prevent waves from inundating the cargo hold. The flooding occurred gradually and probably imperceptibly throughout the final day, finally resulting in a fatal loss of buoyancy and stability. As a result, Edmund Fitzgerald plummeted to the bottom without warning.[110] Video footage of the wreck site showed that most of her hatch clamps were in perfect condition. The USCG Marine board concluded that the few damaged clamps were probably the only ones fastened. As a result, ineffective hatch closure caused Edmund Fitzgerald to flood and founder.[111]
From the beginning of the USCG inquiry, some of the crewmenâs families and various labor organizations believed the USCG findings could be tainted because there were serious questions regarding their preparedness as well as licensing and rules changes.[112] Paul Trimble, a retired USCG vice admiral and president of the Lake Carriers Association (LCA), wrote a letter to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on September 16, 1977, that included the following statements of objection to the USCG findings:
The present hatch covers are an advanced design and are considered by the entire lake shipping industry to be the most significant improvement over the telescoping leaf covers previously used for many years ⌠The one-piece hatch covers have proven completely satisfactory in all weather conditions without a single vessel loss in almost 40 years of use ⌠and no water accumulation in cargo holds âŚ[113]
It was common practice for ore freighters, even in foul weather, to embark with not all cargo clamps locked in place on the hatch covers. Maritime author Wolff reported that depending on weather conditions, all the clamps were eventually set within one to two days.[114] Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes was dismissive of suggestions that unlocked hatch clamps caused Edmund Fitzgerald to founder. He said that he commonly sailed in fine weather using the minimum number of clamps necessary to secure the hatch covers.[115]
The May 4, 1978, NTSB findings differed from the USCG. The NTSB made the following observations based on the CURV-III survey:
The No. 1 hatch cover was entirely inside the No. 1 hatch and showed indications of buckling from external loading. Sections of the coaming in way of the No. 1 hatch were fractured and buckled inward. The No. 2 hatch cover was missing and the coaming on the No. 2 hatch was fractured and buckled. Hatches Nos. 3 and 4 were covered with mud; one corner of hatch cover No. 3 could be seen in place. Hatch cover No. 5 was missing. A series of 16 consecutive hatch cover clamps were observed on the No. 5 hatch coaming. Of this series, the first and eighth were distorted or broken. All of the 14 other clamps were undamaged and in the open position. The No. 6 hatch was open and a hatch cover was standing on end vertically in the hatch. The hatch covers were missing from hatches Nos. 7 and 8 and both coamings were fractured and severely distorted. The bow section abruptly ended just aft of hatch No. 8 and the deck plating was ripped up from the separation to the forward end of hatch No. 7.[116]
The NTSB conducted computer studies,[117] testing and analysis to determine the forces necessary to collapse the hatch covers[118] and concluded that Edmund Fitzgerald sank suddenly from flooding of the cargo hold âdue to the collapse of one or more of the hatch covers under the weight of giant boarding seasâ instead of flooding gradually due to ineffective hatch closures.[119] The NTSB dissenting opinion held that Edmund Fitzgerald sank suddenly and unexpectedly from shoaling.[120]
Shoaling hypothesis[edit]
The LCA believed that instead of hatch cover leakage, the more probable cause of Edmund Fitzgerald 's loss was shoaling or grounding in the Six Fathom Shoal northwest of Caribou Island when the vessel âunknowingly raked a reefâ during the time the Whitefish Point light and radio beacon were not available as navigation aids.[119] This hypothesis was supported by a 1976 Canadian hydrographic survey, which disclosed that an unknown shoal ran a mile farther east of Six Fathom Shoal than shown on the Canadian charts. Officers from Arthur M. Anderson observed that Edmund Fitzgerald sailed through this exact area.[119] Conjecture by proponents of the Six Fathom Shoal hypothesis concluded that Edmund Fitzgerald 's downed fence rail reported by McSorley could occur only if the ship âhoggedâ during shoaling, with the bow and stern bent downward and the midsection raised by the shoal, pulling the railing tight until the cables dislodged or tore under the strain.[49] Divers searched the Six Fathom Shoal after the wreck occurred and found no evidence of âa recent collision or grounding anywhere.â[121] Maritime authors Bishop and Stonehouse wrote that the shoaling hypothesis was later challenged on the basis of the higher quality of detail in Shannonâs 1994 photography that âexplicitly show[s] the devastation of the Edmund Fitzgeraldâ.[88] Shannonâs photography of Edmund Fitzgerald 's overturned stern showed âno evidence on the bottom of the stern, the propeller or the rudder of the ship that would indicate the ship struck a shoal.â[122]
Maritime author Stonehouse reasoned that âunlike the Lake Carriers, the Coast Guard had no vested interest in the outcome of their investigation.â[123] Author Bishop reported that Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes argued that through their support for the shoaling explanation, the LCA represented the shipping companyâs interests by advocating a hypothesis that held LCA member companies, the American Bureau of Shipping, and the U.S. Coast Guard Service blameless.[121]
Paul Hainault, a retired professor of mechanical engineering from Michigan Technological University, promoted a hypothesis that began as a student class project. His hypothesis held that Edmund Fitzgerald grounded at 9:30 a.m. on November 10 on Superior Shoal. This shoal, charted in 1929, is an underwater mountain in the middle of Lake Superior about 50 miles (80 km) north of Copper Harbor, Michigan.[124] It has sharp peaks that rise nearly to the lake surface with water depths ranging from 22 to 400 feet (6.7 to 121.9 m), making it a menace to navigation. Discovery of the shoal resulted in a change in recommended shipping routes.[125] A seiche, or standing wave, that occurred during the low-pressure system over Lake Superior on November 10, 1975, caused the lake to rise 3 feet (0.91 m) over the Soo Locksâs gates to flood Portage Avenue in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, with 1 foot (0.3 m) of water.[126] Hainaultâs hypothesis held that this seiche contributed to Edmund Fitzgerald shoaling 200 feet (61 m) of her hull on Superior Shoal, causing the hull to be punctured mid-body. The hypothesis contended that the wave action continued to damage the hull, until the middle third dropped out like a box, leaving the ship held together by the center deck. The stern section acted as an anchor and caused Edmund Fitzgerald to come to a full stop, causing everything to go forward. The ship broke apart on the surface within seconds. Compressed air pressure blew a hole in the starboard bow, which sank 18 degrees off course. The rear kept going forward with the engine still running, rolled to port and landed bottom up.[127]
Structural failure hypothesis[edit]
Another published hypothesis contends that an already weakened structure, and modification of Edmund Fitzgerald 's winter load line (which allows heavier loading and travel lower in the water), made it possible for large waves to cause a stress fracture in the hull. This is based on the âregularâ huge waves of the storm and does not necessarily involve rogue waves.[128]
The USCG and NTSB investigated whether Edmund Fitzgerald broke apart due to structural failure of the hull and because the 1976 CURV III survey found Edmund Fitzgerald 's sections were 170 feet (52 m) from each other, the USCGâs formal casualty report of July 1977 concluded that she had separated upon hitting the lake floor.[110] The NTSB came to the same conclusion as USCG because:
The proximity of the bow and stern sections on the bottom of Lake Superior indicated that the vessel sank in one piece and broke apart either when it hit bottom or as it descended. Therefore, Edmund Fitzgerald did not sustain a massive structural failure of the hull while on the surface ⌠The final position of the wreckage indicated that if the Edmund Fitzgerald had capsized, it must have suffered a structural failure before hitting the lake bottom. The bow section would have had to right itself and the stern portion would have had to capsize before coming to rest on the bottom. It is, therefore, concluded that the Edmund Fitzgerald did not capsize on the surface.[55]
Other authors have concluded that Edmund Fitzgerald most likely broke in two on the surface before sinking due to the intense waves, like the ore carriers SS Carl D. Bradley and SS Daniel J. Morrell.[129][130][131] After maritime historian Frederick Stonehouse moderated the panel reviewing the video footage from the 1989 ROV survey of Edmund Fitzgerald, he concluded that the extent of taconite coverage over the wreck site showed that the stern had floated on the surface for a short time and spilled taconite into the forward section; thus the two sections of the wreck did not sink at the same time.[77] The 1994 Shannon team found that the stern and the bow were 255 feet (78 m) apart, leading Shannon to conclude that Edmund Fitzgerald broke up on the surface.[82] He said:
This placement does not support the hypothesis that the ship plunged to the bottom in one piece, breaking apart when it struck bottom. If this were true, the two sections would be much closer. In addition, the angle, repose and mounding of clay and mud at the site indicate the stern rolled over on the surface, spilling taconite ore pellets from its severed cargo hold, and then landed on portions of the cargo itself.[82]
The stress fracture hypothesis was supported by the testimony of former crewmen. Former Second Mate Richard Orgel, who served on Edmund Fitzgerald in 1972 and 1973, testified that âthe ship had a tendency to bend and spring during storms âlike a diving board after somebody has jumped off.ââ[132] Orgel was quoted as saying that the loss of Edmund Fitzgerald was caused by hull failure, âpure and simple. I detected undue stress in the side tunnels by examining the white enamel paint, which will crack and splinter when submitted to severe stress.â[133] George H. âRedâ Burgner, Edmund Fitzgerald 's steward for ten seasons and winter ship-keeper for seven years, testified in a deposition that a âloose keelâ contributed to the vesselâs loss. Burgner further testified that âthe keel and sister kelsons were only âtack weldedââ and that he had personally observed that many of the welds were broken.[134] Burgner was not asked to testify before the Marine Board of Inquiry.[132]
When Bethlehem Steel Corporation permanently laid up Edmund Fitzgerald 's sister ship, SS Arthur B. Homer, just five years after going to considerable expense to lengthen her, questions were raised as to whether both ships had the same structural problems.[135] The two vessels were built in the same shipyard using welded joints instead of the riveted joints used in older ore freighters. Riveted joints allow a ship to flex and work in heavy seas, while welded joints are more likely to break.[135] Reports indicate that repairs to Edmund Fitzgerald 's hull were delayed in 1975 due to plans to lengthen the ship during the upcoming winter layup. Arthur B. Homer was lengthened to 825 feet (251 m) and placed back in service by December 1975, not long after Edmund Fitzgerald foundered. In 1978, without explanation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation denied permission for the chairman of the NTSB to travel on Arthur B. Homer. Arthur B. Homer was permanently laid up in 1980 and broken for scrap in 1987.[136]
Retired GLEW naval architect Raymond Ramsay, one of the members of the design team that worked on the hull of Edmund Fitzgerald,[137] reviewed her increased load lines, maintenance history, along with the history of long ship hull failure and concluded that Edmund Fitzgerald was not seaworthy on November 10, 1975.[138] He stated that planning Edmund Fitzgerald to be compatible with the constraints of the St. Lawrence Seaway had placed her hull design in a âstraight jacket [sic?].â[139] Edmund Fitzgerald 's long-ship design was developed without the benefit of research, development, test, and evaluation principles while computerized analytical technology was not available at the time she was built.[140] Ramsay noted that Edmund Fitzgerald 's hull was built with an all-welded (instead of riveted) modular fabrication method,[141] which was used for the first time in the GLEW shipyard.[9][14] Ramsay concluded that increasing the hull length to 729 feet (222 m) resulted in an L/D slenderness ratio (the ratio of the length of the ship to the depth of her structure)[142] that caused excessive multi-axial bending and springing of the hull, and that the hull should have been structurally reinforced to cope with her increased length.[143]
Topside damage hypothesis[edit]
The USCG cited topside damage as a reasonable alternative reason for Edmund Fitzgerald sinking and surmised that damage to the fence rail and vents was possibly caused by a heavy floating object such as a log.[144] Historian and mariner Mark Thompson believes that something broke loose from Edmund Fitzgerald 's deck. He theorized that the loss of the vents resulted in flooding of two ballast tanks or a ballast tank and a walking tunnel that caused the ship to list. Thompson further conjectured that damage more extensive than Captain McSorley could detect in the pilothouse let water flood the cargo hold. He concluded that the topside damage Edmund Fitzgerald experienced at 3:30 p.m. on November 10, compounded by the heavy seas, was the most obvious explanation for why she sank.
Possible contributing factors[edit]
The USCG, NTSB, and proponents of alternative theories have all named multiple possible contributing factors to the foundering of Edmund Fitzgerald.
Weather forecasting[edit]
A scale model of SS Edmund Fitzgerald
The NWS long-range forecast on November 9, 1975, predicted that a storm would pass just south of Lake Superior and over the Keweenaw Peninsula, extending into the Lake from Michiganâs Upper Peninsula. Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes had been following and charting the low-pressure system over Oklahoma since November 8 and concluded that a major storm would track across eastern Lake Superior. He therefore chose a route that gave Wilfred Sykes the most protection and took refuge in Thunder Bay, Ontario, during the worst of the storm. Based on the NWS forecast, Arthur M. Anderson and Edmund Fitzgerald instead started their trip across Lake Superior following the regular Lake Carriers Association route, which placed them in the path of the storm.[145] The NTSB investigation concluded that the NWS failed to accurately predict wave heights on November 10.[146] After running computer models in 2005 using actual meteorological data from November 10, 1975, Hultquist of the NWS said of Edmund Fitzgerald 's position in the storm, âIt ended in precisely the wrong place at the absolute worst time.â[147]
Inaccurate navigational charts[edit]
After reviewing testimony that Edmund Fitzgerald had passed near shoals north of Caribou Island, the USCG Marine Board examined the relevant navigational charts. They found that the Canadian 1973 navigational chart for the Six Fathom Shoal area was based on Canadian surveys from 1916 and 1919 and that the 1973 U.S. Lake Survey Chart No. 9 included the notation, âCanadian Areas. For data concerning Canadian areas, Canadian authorities have been consulted.â[148] Thereafter, at the request of the Marine Board and the Commander of the USCG Ninth District, the Canadian Hydrographic Service conducted a survey of the area surrounding Michipicoten Island and Caribou Island in 1976. The survey revealed that the shoal ran about 1 mile (1.6 km) farther east than shown on Canadian charts.[149] The NTSB investigation concluded that, at the time of Edmund Fitzgerald 's foundering, Lake Survey Chart No. 9 was not detailed enough to indicate Six Fathom Shoal as a hazard to navigation.[146]
Lack of watertight bulkheads[edit]
Mark Thompson, a merchant seaman and author of numerous books on Great Lakes shipping, stated that if her cargo holds had watertight subdivisions, âthe Edmund Fitzgerald could have made it into Whitefish Bay.â[150] Frederick Stonehouse also held that the lack of watertight bulkheads caused Edmund Fitzgerald to sink. He said:
The Great Lakes ore carrier is the most commercially efficient vessel in the shipping trade today. But itâs nothing but a motorized barge! Itâs the unsafest commercial vessel afloat. It has virtually no watertight integrity. Theoretically, a one-inch puncture in the cargo hold will sink it.[151]
Stonehouse called on ship designers and builders to design lake carriers more like ships rather than âmotorized super-bargesâ[152] making the following comparison:
Contrast this [the Edmund Fitzgerald] with the story of the SS Maumee, an oceangoing tanker that struck an iceberg near the South Pole recently. The collision tore a hole in the shipâs bow large enough to drive a truck through, but the Maumee was able to travel halfway around the world to a repair yard, without difficulty, because she was fitted with watertight bulkheads.[153]
After Edmund Fitzgerald foundered, Great Lakes shipping companies were accused of valuing cargo payloads more than human life,[154] since the vesselâs cargo hold of 860,950 cubic feet (24,379 m3) had been divided by two non-watertight traverse âscreenâ bulkheads. The NTSB Edmund Fitzgerald investigation concluded that Great Lakes freighters should be constructed with watertight bulkheads in their cargo holds.[155]
The USCG had proposed rules for watertight bulkheads in Great Lakes vessels as early as the sinking of Daniel J. Morrell in 1966 and did so again after the sinking of Edmund Fitzgerald, arguing that this would allow ships to make it to refuge or at least allow crew members to abandon ship in an orderly fashion. The LCA represented the Great Lakes fleet owners and was able to forestall watertight subdivision regulations[156] by arguing that this would cause economic hardship for vessel operators. A few vessel operators have built Great Lakes ships with watertight subdivisions in the cargo holds since 1975, but most vessels operating on the lakes cannot prevent flooding of the entire cargo hold area.[157]
Lack of instrumentation[edit]
A fathometer was not required under USCG regulations, and Edmund Fitzgerald lacked one,[158] even though fathometers were available at the time of her sinking. Instead, a hand line was the only method Edmund Fitzgerald had to take depth soundings. The hand line consisted of a piece of line knotted at measured intervals with a lead weight on the end. The line was thrown over the bow of the ship and the count of the knots measured the water depth.[159] The NTSB investigation concluded that a fathometer would have provided Edmund Fitzgerald additional navigational data and made her less dependent on Arthur M. Anderson for navigational assistance.[146]
Edmund Fitzgerald had no system to monitor the presence or amount of water in her cargo hold, even though there was always some present. The intensity of the November 10 storm would have made it difficult, if not impossible, to access the hatches from the spar deck (deck over the cargo holds). The USCG Marine Board found that flooding of the hold could not have been assessed until the water reached the top of the taconite cargo.[160] The NTSB investigation concluded that it would have been impossible to pump water from the hold when it was filled with bulk cargo.[161] The Marine Board noted that because Edmund Fitzgerald lacked a draft-reading system, the crew had no way to determine whether the vessel had lost freeboard (the level of a shipâs deck above the water).[162]
Increased load lines, reduced freeboard[edit]
The USCG increased Edmund Fitzgerald 's load line in 1969, 1971, and 1973 to allow 3 feet 3.25 inches (997 mm) less minimum freeboard than Edmund Fitzgerald 's original design allowed in 1958.[110] This meant that Edmund Fitzgerald 's deck was only 11.5 feet (3.5 m) above the water when she faced 35-foot (11 m) waves during the November 10 storm.[163] Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes noted that this change allowed loading to 4,000 tons more than what Edmund Fitzgerald was designed to carry.[164]
Concerns regarding Edmund Fitzgerald 's keel-welding problem surfaced during the time the USCG started increasing her load line.[134] This increase and the resultant reduction in freeboard decreased the vesselâs critical reserve buoyancy. Prior to the load-line increases she was said to be a âgood riding shipâ but afterwards Edmund Fitzgerald became a sluggish ship with slower response and recovery times. Captain McSorley said he did not like the action of a ship he described as a âwiggling thingâ that scared him. Edmund Fitzgerald 's bow hooked to one side or the other in heavy seas without recovering and made a groaning sound not heard on other ships.[134]
Maintenance[edit]
NTSB investigators noted that Edmund Fitzgerald 's prior groundings could have caused undetected damage that led to major structural failure during the storm, since Great Lakes vessels were normally drydocked for inspection only once every five years.[146] It was also alleged that when compared to Edmund Fitzgerald 's previous captain (Peter Pulcer), McSorley did not keep up with routine maintenance and did not confront the mates about getting the requisite work done.[134] After August B. Herbel Jr., president of the American Society for Testing and Materials, examined photographs of the welds on Edmund Fitzgerald, he stated, âthe hull was just being held together with patching plates.â Other questions were raised as to why the USCG did not discover and take corrective action in its pre-November 1975 inspection of Edmund Fitzgerald, given that her hatch coamings, gaskets, and clamps were poorly maintained.[165]
Complacency[edit]
On the fateful evening of November 10, 1975, McSorley reported he had never seen bigger seas in his life.[65] Paquette, master of Wilfred Sykes, out in the same storm, said, âIâll tell anyone that it was a monster sea washing solid water over the deck of every vessel out there.â[166] The USCG did not broadcast that all ships should seek safe anchorage until after 3:35 p.m. on November 10, many hours after the weather was upgraded from a gale to a storm.[50]
McSorley was known as a âheavy weather captainâ[167] who ââbeat hellâ out of the Edmund Fitzgerald and âvery seldom ever hauled up for weatherââ.[134] Paquette held the opinion that negligence caused Edmund Fitzgerald to founder. He said, âin my opinion, all the subsequent events arose because (McSorley) kept pushing that ship and didnât have enough training in weather forecasting to use common sense and pick a route out of the worst of the wind and seas.â[168] Paquetteâs vessel was the first to reach a discharge port after the November 10 storm; she was met by company attorneys who came aboard Sykes. He told them that Edmund Fitzgerald 's foundering was caused by negligence.[169] Paquette was never asked to testify during the USCG or NTSB investigations.[169]
The NTSB investigation noted that Great Lakes cargo vessels could normally avoid severe storms and called for the establishment of a limiting sea state applicable to Great Lakes bulk cargo vessels. This would restrict the operation of vessels in sea states above the limiting value.[170] One concern was that shipping companies pressured the captains to deliver cargo as quickly and cheaply as possible regardless of bad weather.[171] At the time of Edmund Fitzgerald 's foundering, there was no evidence that any governmental regulatory agency tried to control vessel movement in foul weather despite the historical record that hundreds of Great Lakes vessels had been wrecked in storms. The USCG took the position that only the captain could decide when it was safe to sail.[172]
The USCG Marine Board issued the following conclusion:
The nature of Great Lakes shipping, with short voyages, much of the time in very protected waters, frequently with the same routine from trip to trip, leads to complacency and an overly optimistic attitude concerning the extreme weather conditions that can and do exist. The Marine Board feels that this attitude reflects itself at times in deferral of maintenance and repairs, in failure to prepare properly for heavy weather, and in the conviction that since refuges are near, safety is possible by ârunning for it.â While it is true that sailing conditions are good during the summer season, changes can occur abruptly, with severe storms and extreme weather and sea conditions arising rapidly. This tragic accident points out the need for all persons involved in Great Lakes shipping to foster increased awareness of the hazards which exist.[173]
Mark Thompson countered that âthe Coast Guard laid bare [its] own complacencyâ by blaming the sinking of Edmund Fitzgerald on industry-wide complacency since it had inspected Edmund Fitzgerald just two weeks before she sank.[165] The loss of Edmund Fitzgerald also exposed the USCGâs lack of rescue capability on Lake Superior.[174] Thompson said that ongoing budget cuts had limited the USCGâs ability to perform its historical functions. He further noted that USCG rescue vessels were unlikely to reach the scene of an incident on Lake Superior or Lake Huron within 6 to 12 hours of its occurrence.[175]
I liked the song when it was released first in 1976, but I had assumed that it was a song about a historical tragedy say about a sinking a century ago. I was very surprised years later when I had the INTERNET to realise that it was a very modern tragedy.
A great fiddler.
RIP
Former TD Derek Keating.
Not a celeb death.
Andy Rourke RIP
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Ah no! Was he sick? First one of the band to go 
Edit: pancreatic cancer. Fuck sake
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