Michael Cox with a good piece on last night’s game for the Tactics nerds.
Cox: Immobile’s isolation and Olmo’s invention – how two forwards defined Italy vs Spain
By Michael Cox 3h ago
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Tuesday night’s semi-final between Spain and Italy was billed as a battle of midfields: the nation that invented tiki-taka against the nation that has increasingly incorporated those concepts into its own game.
But football matches are never entirely compartmentalised. The midfield battle is inevitably an important concept in deciding the nature of the game but other players are relevant, too. Therefore, the major story from Tuesday’s game was what the two sides were attempting to do further forward. In that respect, these teams were opposites.
Roberto Mancini went with his expected starting XI, which involved Ciro Immobile up front alone, usually looking to run in behind the opposition. Luis Enrique, however, made a surprise selection decision, leaving out centre-forward Alvaro Morata. He didn’t turn to Gerard Moreno, his usual alternative, but instead brought in Mikel Oyarzabal, which meant Dani Olmo playing as a false nine.
This has become another important feature of Spanish footballing philosophy, of course — particularly against Italy. When Spain won Euro 2012, they started the tournament with Cesc Fabregas in that role in their opener against Italy, then spent four matches attempting a variety of more traditional centre-forward options before returning to Fabregas up front for the final, another meeting with Italy. Few expected Olmo to play that role here but this was the game’s key tactical concept.
His importance was relevant within the first minute when Aymeric Laporte fired a ball into the midfield zone behind Marco Verratti and into the feet of Olmo. Verratti, somewhat typically, dived into a tackle and conceded a foul. Already, Olmo’s positioning was causing Italy problems.
Immobile had the opposite approach. If Olmo was always coming short, Immobile was always stretching the play by going in behind. Within the first five minutes, he was twice flagged offside as Italy slipped through balls between Spanish defenders.
And in the space of just over a minute shortly afterwards, two pieces of play showed the difference between Immobile and Olmo’s ability to link play.
First, Immobile came short to receive a long ball from defence but it awkwardly bounced off him and ran away to Cesar Azpilicueta. In contrast, Olmo was able to drop into the midfield zone, receive a neat pass, and lay the ball off comfortably.
The more the game continued, the more Olmo started to dominate proceedings. This move again featured him dropping deeper to form a diamond with the other three Spanish central midfielders, turning and firing the ball out to Oyarzabal on the right flank.
He was particularly good at helping Spain play passing combinations down the right, positioning himself in an inside-right position in two examples below, first laying the ball off to Koke, who could move wider to the right, and then receiving a pass from Oyarzabal with his back to goal, turning, and helping Spain switch play.
The obvious question, though, is whether Olmo was actually helping Spain find penetration and providing a goal threat. In simple terms, the answer is no — Olmo ends his tournament as the player who attempted the most shots without scoring. His positioning, though, was very useful.
Here’s the best example: Pedri is on the ball, running towards the Italy defence. Olmo is highlighted in his regular position between the lines, behind Jorginho, while Oyarzabal is Spain’s most advanced player between Giorgio Chiellini and Emerson.
Oyarzabal’s run is the problem here — Emerson isn’t quite in the right position to track him, so Chiellini has to be aware of his movement. But, as Pedri prepares to play the pass, Chiellini suddenly jumps out to shut down Olmo, which means Pedri has the right passing lane to slide the ball into Oyarzabal.
A better first touch and this would have been a clear goalscoring opportunity, showing the danger of Chiellini getting dragged out by Spain’s false nine.
Olmo’s ability to link play was wonderful, both with clever little flicks, like the one here to Pedri, or by coming short and then hitting long diagonal balls out wide, like this pass to Ferran Torres.
His obvious weakness, though, was in traditional centre-forward positions. This situation might have been turned into a proper chance if Olmo was a natural striker but he ended up stalling slightly and was eventually outmuscled by Chiellini.
Immobile, meanwhile, was receiving no service whatsoever. This is how Italy were attempting to find him — with hopeful balls over the Spain defence in behind. Both these passes were too straight and ran through to goalkeeper Unai Simon.
Olmo, on the other hand, continued to look lively. He acted as the wall for a one-two initiated by Pedri and then was dribbling through the centre dangerously when the referee blew for half-time, a fitting final sequence of the first half.
In the second half, the pattern remained consistent but both sides started to look more threatening. This long ball from Jorginho was well-weighted, unlike several passes in behind during the first half, and found Immobile running in behind in the inside-left channel. That was always likely to be the zone Italy caused problems against two left-footed Spanish centre-backs more comfortable covering space towards the opposite side. Immobile attempted an ambitious lob here but was off-balance.
Olmo kept on coming short, and Spain started to find more space. Here, he again dragged Chiellini up the pitch before slipping the ball sideways as Spain attacked with multiple runners from midfield. Torres ended up taking this shot from a poor position, with Koke in oceans of space on the far side, demonstrating how Italy’s defence was being dragged out of shape.
And then, after an hour, there was finally a goal. The surprise was that it was scored by Italy, against the run of play — although it was broadly in keeping with their approach play. Lorenzo Insigne attempted to slip in Immobile, again making a run to the left of the pitch, which forced Eric Garcia and Laporte to sprint back and cover the space in behind.
Laporte made a good last-ditch tackle, but the ball ran loose…
…and because Immobile’s run in behind had pushed Spain’s defence deep, there was a huge amount of space in front of the two centre-backs. Sergio Busquets couldn’t drop back and fill the space in front, so Federico Chiesa had a huge amount of space and time, and used it wonderfully to bend home a sensational opener.
Immediately after that goal went in, both managers made changes. Mancini removed Immobile and brought on winger Domenico Berardi, moving Insigne inside to play as something approaching a false nine.
Luis Enrique, meanwhile, brought on Morata for the wasteful Torres.
This showed two things. First, that the situation had changed, and the sides required different things from the strikers. Second, that Immobile hadn’t been particularly effective while Olmo deserved to stay on the pitch.
And now, in Morata, the game had a centre-forward who — at his best — can do both elements of the game. He can come short like Olmo and he can run in behind like Immobile, and, 20 minutes after Italy’s opener, the equaliser came from Morata. It was a goal that demonstrated his all-around game wonderfully.
First, he did what Olmo had been doing, dropping in to make a four-versus-three situation in the midfield zone, and received a forward pass from Laporte. He then controlled it on the turn, instantly moving forward on the ball.
He then swapped passes with Olmo, now drifting infield from the left, and sprinted in behind to receive the return ball before slotting home.
If this was a regular match decided after 90 minutes, this would have been a neat finale — never mind simply coming short or simply running in behind: get yourself a striker who can do both.
Morata, on his day, is a very effective all-around centre-forward but this game went to extra time — which was largely uneventful — before being decided on penalties, where Morata was the unfortunate fall guy.
The sides couldn’t be separated in 120 minutes of action. There was more separation than we might have expected, though, in their approach to possession play.
