liam carroll and his unprecedented attempts to get examinership with the backing of the banks (the ones in NAMA) in spite of no chance of being in a tradeable position for at least 3 years to come is making me nervous.
The banks want this for definite reasons of the sweetheart deal of NAMA and obviously with fianna fail involved you know it won’t be any good for the people of Ireland.
anyone have any viable alternatives for this shit we’re in ?
Any alternative that involves setting up a scaffold in College Green.
Fine Gael haven’t really worked through their alternativs yet.
plenty about it on politics.ie
couple of suggestions form irishelection and true economics:
good bank strategy. basically what FG want to do. set up a bank to take care of salary payments, and performing loans. sub-contract the job of managing loan books back to the banks.
interestingly, a more socialist perspective:
spend 90m on residential property mortgages (gross bank bad debt is thought to be approx 90m commercial and 150m residential)
in the form of mortgage relief to each homeowner.
banks get the same capital injection as under NAMA, taxpayers get a sudden increase in disposable income.
[quote=“treaty_exile”]Fine Gael haven’t really worked through their alternativs yet.
plenty about it on politics.ie
couple of suggestions form irishelection and true economics:
good bank strategy. basically what FG want to do. set up a bank to take care of salary payments, and performing loans. sub-contract the job of managing loan books back to the banks.
interestingly, a more socialist perspective:
spend 90m on residential property mortgages (gross bank bad debt is thought to be approx 90m commercial and 150m residential)
in the form of mortgage relief to each homeowner.
banks get the same capital injection as under NAMA, taxpayers get a sudden increase in disposable income.[/quote]
90 million?
my bad.
[quote=“treaty_exile”]Fine Gael haven’t really worked through their alternativs yet.
plenty about it on politics.ie
couple of suggestions form irishelection and true economics:
good bank strategy. basically what FG want to do. set up a bank to take care of salary payments, and performing loans. sub-contract the job of managing loan books back to the banks. [/quote]
Salary payments? Dont understand?
interestingly, a more socialist perspective:
spend 90m on residential property mortgages (gross bank bad debt is thought to be approx 90m commercial and 150m residential)
in the form of mortgage relief to each homeowner.
banks get the same capital injection as under NAMA, taxpayers get a sudden increase in disposable income.
FFS. What happens if people decide to save the newly created disposable income? There is a shit load of money in this country, a lot of poor people struggling but there is a lot of wealthy people sitting on shed loads of cash. The vast majority of people who have mortgages are not poor, you would be using a massive tax break but it seems a massively inefficient way to aid those struggling with their mortgage repayments. Personally I dont see a massive problem within the residential mortgage book of the mainstream banks. Iv asked it on here before, how many FTB do you know with a mortgage from AIB/BOI? Not many they were v tight on home loan lending in the main part.
Posted my views on NAMA here a few times so not going to do it again, I think its a reasonable solution to a really shitty situation. The main alternative given is to nationalise the Banks. I understand that the key issue with this is if the Banks are nationalised many countries/pension funds/institutional investors cannot buy their bonds/debt due to regulatory restrictions on purchasing nationalised debt.
The commentary on the situation in the press is nothing short of shocking though. Some seriously misguided views being propogated on both sides.
[quote=“dancarter”]Salary payments? Dont understand?
FFS. What happens if people decide to save the newly created disposable income? There is a shit load of money in this country, a lot of poor people struggling but there is a lot of wealthy people sitting on shed loads of cash. The vast majority of people who have mortgages are not poor, you would be using a massive tax break but it seems a massively inefficient way to aid those struggling with their mortgage repayments. Personally I dont see a massive problem within the residential mortgage book of the mainstream banks. Iv asked it on here before, how many FTB do you know with a mortgage from AIB/BOI? Not many they were v tight on home loan lending in the main part.
Posted my views on NAMA here a few times so not going to do it again, I think its a reasonable solution to a really shitty situation. The main alternative given is to nationalise the Banks. I understand that the key issue with this is if the Banks are nationalised many countries/pension funds/institutional investors cannot buy their bonds/debt due to regulatory restrictions on purchasing nationalised debt.
The commentary on the situation in the press is nothing short of shocking though. Some seriously misguided views being propogated on both sides.[/quote]
dan- do you think years of working in the banks & the culture of greed that the banks evidently had may have shaped your views on this?
[quote=“dancarter”]Salary payments? Dont understand?
FFS. What happens if people decide to save the newly created disposable income? There is a shit load of money in this country, a lot of poor people struggling but there is a lot of wealthy people sitting on shed loads of cash. The vast majority of people who have mortgages are not poor, you would be using a massive tax break but it seems a massively inefficient way to aid those struggling with their mortgage repayments. Personally I dont see a massive problem within the residential mortgage book of the mainstream banks. Iv asked it on here before, how many FTB do you know with a mortgage from AIB/BOI? Not many they were v tight on home loan lending in the main part.
Posted my views on NAMA here a few times so not going to do it again, I think its a reasonable solution to a really shitty situation. The main alternative given is to nationalise the Banks. I understand that the key issue with this is if the Banks are nationalised many countries/pension funds/institutional investors cannot buy their bonds/debt due to regulatory restrictions on purchasing nationalised debt.
The commentary on the situation in the press is nothing short of shocking though. Some seriously misguided views being propogated on both sides.[/quote]
dan, the banks have to take some of a hit on this and the property developers the rest, not the taxpayer
nAMA is a jokeshop and the price paid for the otxic loans should be somewhre south of 50% of the loan book value
Your a tiresome cunt.
I have worked in various roles in various Banks over the past 8 years. I worked in a credit role for the last number of years with a Bank you have probably never heard of and was not involved in any property lending since 2002 when in a graduate programme I was involved in underwriting home loans for one of the Banks that is now covered by the government guarantee. I now work in corporate recovery, note use of the word corporate not retail, primarily for the reason that I was not involved in the provision of the loans in the first place.
The culture of greed is very evident at the top of the banks but your bog standard AIB/BOI employee would be more than pleased with civil servants pay scale. For the most part they are overworked and unnderpaid and bear the brunt of ignorant and abusive comments.
[quote=“dancarter”]Your a tiresome cunt.
I have worked in various roles in various Banks over the past 8 years. I worked in a credit role for the last number of years with a Bank you have probably never heard of and was not involved in any property lending since 2002 when in a graduate programme I was involved in underwriting home loans for one of the Banks that is now covered by the government guarantee. I now work in corporate recovery, note use of the word corporate not retail, primarily for the reason that I was not involved in the provision of the loans in the first place.
The culture of greed is very evident at the top of the banks but your bog standard AIB/BOI employee would be more than pleased with civil servants pay scale. For the most part they are overworked and unnderpaid and bear the brunt of ignorant and abusive comments.[/quote]
woah woah woah - easy tiger - i didnt ask for a synopsis of your career- all i asked was did the employees of the bank buy into the culture of the bank
[quote=“artfoley”]dan, the banks have to take some of a hit on this and the property developers the rest, not the taxpayer
nAMA is a jokeshop and the price paid for the otxic loans should be somewhre south of 50% of the loan book value[/quote]
Did you even read my other posts on this in the other thread? If NAMA pays 50% it will most likely cause such a huge capital input into the banks that they woudl need to be nationalised. I have outlined a key reason above why this cant happen.
The Banks will take a huge hit on this Art, let me repeat this once more. If NAMA pays 70% for a loan, neither the Bank nor the Developer can walk away from their liability, neither is being indemnified from further loss.
NAMA will have far greater power than the banks do at the moment to go after the borrowers and try to seize any of their assets. This is a key tenet of the bill.
NAMA will reciever a levy form the participating banks every year it is in existince. This is to cover any losses NAMA makes.
An example. 100 m loan, NAMA pays 70 m to the Bank for it. Sells the asset only gets 50 mln for it. The Bank then owes NAMA 20 mln, so the Bank will have taken the full hit/loss of 50 m on the loan, if no further funds can be recovered from the borrowers.
NAMA allows the Banks take this hit over time rather than all up front, which would cripple them.
BOI got 3.5bn last year from the government, it believes that it will be able to repay it within 12 months. The core business of the Banks will continue to generate profits that can back up this plan.
Final point, it is stiched into the NAMA bill that the government has the rights to purchase up to 25% of the ord shares of the banks at a price struck when the capital input was provided, so if AIB shares go up to 5 on the back of the NAMA scheme the gov can purchase at say 50c and sell for 5 making them another tidy profit in the process.
I have no love for FF either but you need to take off the blinkers, not every single thing they do is wrong, most maybe, but I think once they provided the full guarantee which was a mistake they had a big hole to dig out of. NAMA seems to me at least to be a reasonable solution to this. I still havent seen a better alternative anyways
Some did, most came in clocked there cards and fucked off home.
Anyways, within any of the Banks about 10% of the staff were involved in the higher end shit that got us into this mess. Most are involved in making sure your ATM card is ordered, you get your statements on time.
[quote=“dancarter”]Did you even read my other posts on this in the other thread? If NAMA pays 50% it will most likely cause such a huge capital input into the banks that they woudl need to be nationalised. I have outlined a key reason above why this cant happen.
The Banks will take a huge hit on this Art, let me repeat this once more. If NAMA pays 70% for a loan, neither the Bank nor the Developer can walk away from their liability, neither is being indemnified from further loss.
NAMA will have far greater power than the banks do at the moment to go after the borrowers and try to seize any of their assets. This is a key tenet of the bill.
NAMA will reciever a levy form the participating banks every year it is in existince. This is to cover any losses NAMA makes.
An example. 100 m loan, NAMA pays 70 m to the Bank for it. Sells the asset only gets 50 mln for it. The Bank then owes NAMA 20 mln, so the Bank will have taken the full hit/loss of 50 m on the loan, if no further funds can be recovered from the borrowers.
NAMA allows the Banks take this hit over time rather than all up front, which would cripple them.
BOI got 3.5bn last year from the government, it believes that it will be able to repay it within 12 months. The core business of the Banks will continue to generate profits that can back up this plan.
Final point, it is stiched into the NAMA bill that the government has the rights to purchase up to 25% of the ord shares of the banks at a price struck when the capital input was provided, so if AIB shares go up to 5 on the back of the NAMA scheme the gov can purchase at say 50c and sell for 5 making them another tidy profit in the process.
I have no love for FF either but you need to take off the blinkers, not every single thing they do is wrong, most maybe, but I think once they provided the full guarantee which was a mistake they had a big hole to dig out of. NAMA seems to me at least to be a reasonable solution to this. I still havent seen a better alternative anyways[/quote]
will read the bill tomorrow and come back to you
have an exam in the afternoon, so can’t look at it properly at the minute
[quote=“artfoley”]will read the bill tomorrow and come back to you
have an exam in the afternoon, so can’t look at it properly at the minute[/quote]
Good man, I have a privately comissioned report from one of the top Law firms to compare your responses to.
BTW, one key point which I meant to make above. I would have a strong bet that this NAMA initiative is driven by the ECB/IMF and not the Irish government.
Good point, can’t imagine the Govt having the imagination to come up with it.
Imagination maybe. The gumption to follow it through in the face of massive opposition from the public, high profile economists and virtually every other member of the dail is less likely.
[quote=“dancarter”]
FFS. What happens if people decide to save the newly created disposable income? There is a shit load of money in this country, a lot of poor people struggling but there is a lot of wealthy people sitting on shed loads of cash. The vast majority of people who have mortgages are not poor, you would be using a massive tax break but it seems a massively inefficient way to aid those struggling with their mortgage repayments. Personally I dont see a massive problem within the residential mortgage book of the mainstream banks. Iv asked it on here before, how many FTB do you know with a mortgage from AIB/BOI? Not many they were v tight on home loan lending in the main part. [/quote]
The problem is defintely not with residential mortgages but the problem in ignoring that impact is that you’re then bailing out the banks that were greedy at the expense of the ones who only lent to residential customers.
PTSB for example had a more aggressive lending policy than BOI to residential customers, as did BOS, EBS and others. But they didn’t get involved in the large scale reckless lending to developers that caused this problem (well EBS didn’t until the end).
So you have to be careful about providing too much assistance to the banks that were reckless while acknowledging that those who didn’t lend to developers deserve some protection from bad debts, as those banks are suffering losses on the back of the problems the other banks caused to this economy.
It’s little use saying BOI/AIB were tight on mortgage lending while at the same time ignoring the fact that they were utterly reckless in other lending - I know you’re not ignoring them in your solution but NAMA must be more equitable than just a device to prop up the two institutions. It has to reward good practice and punish bad practice IMO.
None of the banks were squeakly clean obviously but I think if we’re seen to just protect the two big banks, it smacks of all the downside of socialism (i.e. protectionism) with none of the upside (i.e. wealth sharing).
[quote=“Rocko”]The problem is defintely not with residential mortgages but the problem in ignoring that impact is that you’re then bailing out the banks that were greedy at the expense of the ones who only lent to residential customers.
PTSB for example had a more aggressive lending policy than BOI to residential customers, as did BOS, EBS and others. But they didn’t get involved in the large scale reckless lending to developers that caused this problem (well EBS didn’t until the end).
So you have to be careful about providing too much assistance to the banks that were reckless while acknowledging that those who didn’t lend to developers deserve some protection from bad debts, as those banks are suffering losses on the back of the problems the other banks caused to this economy.
It’s little use saying BOI/AIB were tight on mortgage lending while at the same time ignoring the fact that they were utterly reckless in other lending - I know you’re not ignoring them in your solution but NAMA must be more equitable than just a device to prop up the two institutions. It has to reward good practice and punish bad practice IMO.
None of the banks were squeakly clean obviously but I think if we’re seen to just protect the two big banks, it smacks of all the downside of socialism (i.e. protectionism) with none of the upside (i.e. wealth sharing).[/quote]
PTSB would most likely have struggled big time too if they hadnt been brought under the guarantee because of funding issues. EBS would have struggled to absorb the hits they would have taken, they got into the market late. It would take the profit from a fair amount of home loans to make up the loss on one development loan.
So I dont think its completely correct to say its a scheme just to prop up the two main banks. They are the key beneficiaries alright but they are the two largest and most important by a distance. I think they will all be merged anyways in the near future.
As for wealth sharing, I mentioned above that there is a mechanism within the NAMA scheme for the gov to benefit form any upside in Banks share values
[quote=“dancarter”]Salary payments? Dont understand?
FFS. What happens if people decide to save the newly created disposable income? There is a shit load of money in this country, a lot of poor people struggling but there is a lot of wealthy people sitting on shed loads of cash. The vast majority of people who have mortgages are not poor, you would be using a massive tax break but it seems a massively inefficient way to aid those struggling with their mortgage repayments. Personally I dont see a massive problem within the residential mortgage book of the mainstream banks. Iv asked it on here before, how many FTB do you know with a mortgage from AIB/BOI? Not many they were v tight on home loan lending in the main part.
Posted my views on NAMA here a few times so not going to do it again, I think its a reasonable solution to a really shitty situation. The main alternative given is to nationalise the Banks. I understand that the key issue with this is if the Banks are nationalised many countries/pension funds/institutional investors cannot buy their bonds/debt due to regulatory restrictions on purchasing nationalised debt.
The commentary on the situation in the press is nothing short of shocking though. Some seriously misguided views being propogated on both sides.[/quote]
salaries Dan, the paying of wages. stocking ATMs. getting back to being repositories of cash. what banks were invented for.
ditto small loans. not elysian apartments, loans.
nationalise and take care of the bare necessities of the banking business.
there is a shit load of money in this country. what little the banks have isn’t being lent, so I don’t see any difference between giving 90bn to the banks as to the taxpayer. just as difficult to control where it’ll be spent.
you must be the only economic commentator i’ve read who’s in favour of NAMA outside of ahearne. like most joe soaps, i’ve to rely on others to interpret the legislation for me, and sheer weight of numbers suggests this plan could end badly.
as regards underfunding NAMA, what difference does it make to the banks whether or not they sell loans or receive funds in return for share options? money in the bank either way to them. tax payer foots the bill, but at least has the cold comfort of knowing they’re not being over-charged.
to the untrained eye, the emphasis here seems to be maximizing the return (or minimising the loss?) for bond investors. as opposed to the tax payer.
i’m assuming the reason for this is to reduce the amount of capital required from the tax payer in favour of international investors. but if the cost of this investment is NAMA, why bother set up a glorified national SPV in the first place?
nationalise, recapitalise and be damned.
effect the changes you deem necessary (and you could really let ahearne go to town here) and sell off at a later date. I’d imagine it’ll be a lot easier sell a performing bank than those unfinished semi-Ds in termonfeckin.
[quote=“treaty_exile”]as regards underfunding NAMA, what difference does it make to the banks whether or not they sell loans or receive funds in return for share options? money in the bank either way to them. tax payer foots the bill, but at least has the cold comfort of knowing they’re not being over-charged.
to the untrained eye, the emphasis here seems to be maximizing the return (or minimising the loss?) for bond investors. as opposed to the tax payer.
i’m assuming the reason for this is to reduce the amount of capital required from the tax payer in favour of international investors. but if the cost of this investment is NAMA, why bother set up a glorified national SPV in the first place?
nationalise, recapitalise and be damned.
effect the changes you deem necessary (and you could really let ahearne go to town here) and sell off at a later date. I’d imagine it’ll be a lot easier sell a performing bank than those unfinished semi-Ds in termonfeckin.[/quote]
Yeah I’d agree with a lot of that. Watching Prime Time there a few weeks ago and one of the lads on it made the point that usually investment valuations are “marked to market” and in NAMA’s case they were looking at “marking to hope.” (repeated below)
Anyway the economists are out in force in the Irish Times today:
Nama set to shift wealth to lenders and developers
OPINION: Forty-six academic economists and lecturers in business think the Government has got it wrong on the National Asset Management Agency. Here, they explain why
SINCE THE publication of the draft heads of the National Asset Management Agency (Nama) Bill some issues relating to how it will work have become clearer, while others remain less so.
Three main elements have attracted commentary. The first is the perceived lack of transparency concerning Namas operation and oversight by the Oireachtas of the agencys actions. To be fair, Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan has stated that he is willing to take amendments, and in particular on this area.
Another issue, which remains opaque, is the duration and scope of Nama. In terms of duration we remain unclear as to how long it will linger. Minister for Defence Willie ODea has suggested that Nama could dispose of its task in seven to 10 years.
However, other sources have stated that it will not be bound to any time-frame, but will take as long as required.
This is bound up with the third element, the most opaque of all the price that Nama will pay (in aggregate) for its assets.
The price and duration are interlinked as Nama will not necessarily pay market (or as they are now being called fire clearance) prices for land and development (as explained in section 58 of the Bill). Instead, it will, in the memorable phrase of Dr Peter Bacon, mark to hope.
This it will do by taking the market price as a basis and then adjusting upwards to fair economic value. This concept works on the assumption that in the short term, property and development prices will rise. Thus, Nama will make a profit and it would be somehow unfair to now pay a low asset price.
This has been criticised as flying in the face of evidence from previous similar crashes, and as being based on a very optimistic forecast of the Irish economy in the medium term.
The key difficulty facing the Government is that to pay existing market prices would leave the banks sitting on losses large enough as to effectively bankrupt them. This would then require the State to invest in the banks to such an extent as to effectively nationalise them.
Consequently, it is clear that the Government is determined to pay a price for land and speculative developments greatly in excess of the market clearing price.
Nama has unfolded against the slow but steady deterioration in the States finances. We now look to be on course for a Government deficit of close to 30 billion. In short, this means that for every 1 the State spends, it takes in tax only 50 cent.
To close this gap in State expenditure would require the implementation of more then five times the identified savings of the McCarthy report.
It is also clear that while world economic conditions might well begin to improve in 2010, this will not easily translate into improved conditions here. A significant structural deficit remains in place in the Irish State finances with as yet little in the way of solid policies implemented to close this.
Nama is expected to transfer about 90 billion (in book value) of loans from the banks. In exchange, the banks will receive a percentage of this value in the form of Nama bonds which can then be exchanged for cash at the European Central Bank.
While the precise national accounting treatment of these bonds remains unclear, it is prudent and correct to treat them as State liabilities for whose repayment the taxpayer will ultimately be responsible.
It is also highly probable that the agency cannot pay for itself. The loans being transferred are impaired, and by definition not paying their way. Even with the contribution of added value from performing loans, it remains probable that Nama will run at a loss. Consequently, the taxpayer will face an annual bill.
Regardless of this, and as noted, it is clear that the Government will pay significantly above market value for these loans. Current estimates are that the State may issue agency bonds worth upwards of 60 billion in total for the 90 billion book value.
However, judgments from court cases reveal that bond buybacks and debt for equity swaps in the majority of cases is not two-thirds of the book value, as would be implied by the Nama payment of 60 billion, but is closer to 30 billion.
Thus, by overpaying, the State will wind up transferring to private individuals a sum close to the entire tax take across all tax heads.
In a period of fiscal collapse this is surely not a decision that should be taken lightly, if at all.
At the conclusion of Nama or any alterative approach, all are agreed that what is required is a working, healthy, banking system.
All are agreed that Nama on its own is but an enabler of that. A healthy working banking system is not dependent, we suggest, on a massive transfer of wealth from taxpayers to private risk-takers.
A number of proposals have been put forward which would avoid this in whole or in part and which would, we argue, be at least as effective as Nama in laying the ground for such a banking system. These models have been well discussed through a variety of blogs on the web and in the mainstream media.
All share a number of key characteristics.
First, they work from the premise that those that have invested in risky capital in the banks (the shareholders and bondholders) must accept that the value of their asset is gravely impaired. At a minimum the equity element of the Irish banks, were they required to take on any significant part of the losses made in speculative lending, would be wiped out.
Second, they propose that certain classes of bondholders also be required to accept reductions in value. It is probable that the losses of the banks are such that even eliminating all equity value would not absorb said losses. Unlike the equity, most of the bonds are in great part covered by the 2008 State guarantee. However, the vast majority of this debt matures outside the September 2010 expiry date for this guarantee.
So the Government is in a strong position, if it chooses, to negotiate with bondholders to engage in some debt for equity swaps.
This on its own, however, is still unlikely to provide sufficient capital for the banks to operate without State support in an international environment that now demands far higher levels of capital than prevailed prior to the crisis.
Consequently the third element is that the State, on a temporary basis, becomes the pre-eminent shareholder in the banks, working swiftly to float a reorganised banking system anew. Alternative proposals have different twists to them. But the essence is that all three contain the three points mentioned above. Thus, to say that there is no alternative to Nama is incorrect.
We therefore urge the Government to reconsider its approach to payment for loans to be taken into Nama, to pay no more than current market value which can be ascertained even in these times and to require the investors in the banks to bear some of the cost of restructuring the system. Moreover, we also argue that the Government should not burden the State with more debt than is absolutely required.
To do otherwise would be economic folly.
LIST OF SIGNATORIES
Prof Brian Lucey, School of Business, Trinity College Dublin.
Prof Karl Whelan, Department of Economics, University College Dublin.
Prof Bernadette Andreosso-OCallaghan, Department of Economics, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Prof Colm Harmon, Department of Economics, UCD.
Prof Frank Barry, professor of international business, Trinity College Dublin.
Prof Gregory Connor, Department of Economics, NUI Maynooth.
Prof John Cotter, professor of finance, Smurfit School of Business, UCD.
Prof Kevin ORourke, Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin.
Prof Rodney Thom, Department of Economics, UCD.
Prof Rowena Pecchenino, head of department, Department of Economics, NUI Maynooth.
Dr Constantin Gurdgiev, lecturer in finance, School of Business, Trinity College Dublin.
Dr Alexander Sevic, lecturer in finance, School of Business, Trinity College Dublin.
Patrick McCabe, senior lecturer in accounting and finance, School of Business, Trinity College Dublin.
Dr Jenny Berrill, lecturer in finance, School of Business, Trinity College.
Dr Anthony Leddin, senior lecturer and head of department, Department of Economics, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Dr Helena Lenihan, senior lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Dr Mel Kilkenny, lecturer in finance and taxation, Department of Accounting and Finance, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Dr Sheila Killian, senior lecturer in accounting and finance, Department of Accounting and Finance, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Dr Stephen Kinsella, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Dr Donal Palcic, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Dr Eoin Reeves, senior lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, Kemmy School of Business, University of Limerick.
Eithne Murphy, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, NUI Galway.
Dr Terry McDonagh, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, NUI Galway.
Dr Ashley Piggins, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, NUI Galway.
Dr Cathal ODonoghue, head of Rural Economy Research Centre Teagasc and Department of Economics, NUI Galway.
Dr Thomas Flavin, senior lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, NUI Maynooth.
Dr Tom OConnor, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, NUI Maynooth.
Paul OSullivan, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, NUI Maynooth
Dr Fabrice Rousseau, senior lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, NUI Maynooth
Dr Cal Muckley, lecturer in finance, Smurfit School of Business, UCD
Dr Frank Walsh, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCD
Dr Kevin Denny, senior lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCD
Dr Moore McDowell, senior lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCD
Dr Sarah Parlane, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCD.
Dr Shane Whelan, senior lecturer in actuarial finance, School of Mathematics, UCD.
Dr Vincent Hogan, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCD.
Dr Ray Donnelly, senior lecturer in accounting and finance, Department of Accounting and Finance, UCC.
Dr John Masson, lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCC
Dr Declan Jordan, college lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCC
Eoin OLeary, senior lecturer in economics, Department of Economics, UCC
Stephen OCallaghan, lecturer in accounting and finance, Department of Accounting and Finance, UCC.
John Doran, lecturer in accounting and finance, Department of Accounting and Finance, UCC.
David Humphreys, lecturer in accounting and finance, Department of Accounting and Finance, UCC.
Tony Foley, senior lecturer in economics, DCU Business School.
Dr Valerio Poti, lecturer in finance, DCU Business School.
Claire Kearney, lecturer in finance, DCU Business School.