Joleon Lescott’s goal versus Arsenal on Sunday proved the tipping point in a major debate on set-piece defending.
As readily as night follows day, Arsenal’s concession of Joleon Lescott’s goal on Sunday prompted the standard criticisms of the zonal marking system.
A zone never scores a goal. A running jump beats a standing jump. No one takes responsibility.
Cross them off your checklist then screw up the checklist into a ball and throw it at the television in frustration. Britain’s distrust of zonal marking is a bizarre feature of the national footballing identity and the last bastion of British boneheadedness in a country that is finally seeing the benefit of deep-lying passers and embracing formations other than 4-4-2.
Like any strategy in football, whatever suits the players at the coach’s disposal is always the best bet. There’s no “better” strategy, and the major benefit of a zonal system is that it is proactive; it covers space evenly across the danger zone, meaning players don’t get dragged out of position or blocked off by opponents.
“Who was picking him up?” a pundit will scream when a side concedes a goal while defending zonally. Well, no one. That’s entirely the point. The valid question would be the admittedly less punchy “Whose zone was he in?” This is the most frustrating thing: the insistence of rubbishing zonal defending from a man-for-man mindset. In fact, the entire term “zonal marking” is evidence of this – it’s certainly “zonal,” but is it “marking?” Marking – even if not prefixed by “man” – usually means tracking an opponent. It is zonal defending as opposed to zonal marking.
Zonal defending’s most famous advocate is Rafael Benitez. The former Liverpool coach isn’t the only coach who favours it – he’s not even the most celebrated. Pep Guardiola built the greatest football side of the modern era at Barcelona, a team that successfully defended zonally at set pieces – but Guardiola wasn’t coaching in England so the topic wasn’t such an issue.
Benitez remains a firm defender of the system to the extent that he has published figures on his personal website outlining Liverpool’s defensive record at set pieces during his tenure – plus an unfavourable comparison with his successors. These statistics show that in two separate seasons, Liverpool conceded the fewest goals from corners in the Premier League.
Of course, these figures are inconclusive. They don’t necessarily demonstrate that Liverpool was more successful at the process of defending corners – we need to see how many corners each side conceded in order to gauge how effective they were. Liverpool was bound to be at the top of those tables for a simple reason: Rafa’s Reds were a good side that held the ball for long periods and therefore rarely had to defend corners. Still, those figures suggest it wasn’t a huge problem – certainly not in comparison with the amount of negative media coverage it attracted.
Rafa Benitez is a major proponent of zonal defending from set pieces, and his Liverpool teams conceded few goals as a result. Yet there’s more to their success than Rafa’s plan.
The chief criticism of defending zonally is that no one takes responsibility, an argument that misses the point entirely. Ex-coaches who persist with this line of debate are actually adopting quite a cowardly approach – “No one takes responsibility” is a synonym for “There’s no player I can blame.” Ironically, it also demonstrates that they’re unwilling to take responsibility themselves.
There have been studies suggesting zonal defending is more effective than man-for-man defending, but these findings must be treated with caution; ultimately, the success of both systems depends on the qualities of the players involved. However, there is a significant school of thought among top-level coaches that zonal is the way to go; if they’re correct, it’s remarkable that other managers are happy to compromise their sides’ chances of success for the sake of their own reputation.
Think about it: If a side defends 100 corners and concedes eight goals by man-marking, then defends 100 more corners conceding five goals through zonal defending, which is the better system? The latter, obviously. Nevertheless, for the eight goals, an individual will be blamed. For the five goals, the system will be blamed.
Why? It is a built-in feature of the man-marking system that players are responsible for their own individual contests, given that they can obviously lose. You cannot blame a player, rub your hands and move on. You’re still conceding a goal and your system has still been unsuccessful. A coach might feel better being able to shout at one player, but this doesn’t help the side concede fewer goals.
That’s why Benitez demonstrated great bravery by persevering with the system despite constant media criticism. Was it the right approach? We don’t know, but he was prepared to receive the flak and take responsibility. A lesser coach would have switched to man-marking, content to blame it on, say, Djimi Traore.
It’s a similar situation when it comes to putting men next to posts at corners – it looks ridiculous when a goal is conceded. Why was there no one there? But no one mentions, of course, that if you don’t have two men on posts, the players don’t vanish from the penalty box – they help defend the ball with their teammates and ensure there’s less chance of the ball reaching the goal in the first place.
Yet such scenarios are less noticeable. You never hear a pundit say, “Well, they cleared that corner effectively – that’s why you don’t put men on posts!” Neither, when a goal is conceded with two men on the posts, are we told, “Well, if they didn’t have men on posts, they might have stopped the header coming in!” But both are legitimate points, and over time, the statistics might indicate that putting no one on posts is beneficial.
Oddly, zonal defending’s chief critics generally insist upon putting men on posts, blissfully unaware that this, in itself, is a form of zonal defending. The two arguments have the same root: the availability heuristic, whereby people base a judgment on the ease with which they can bring something to mind. It’s more obvious and more striking when zonal marking goes wrong, but that doesn’t mean it’s necessarily less effective.
Don’t know if this has been posted before
[SIZE=14px][FONT=Arial]Louis van Gaal’s philosophy (at Barça, 78 PowerPoint slides) in cooperation with Frans Hoek and Lluís Lainz [/FONT][/SIZE]
Hey guys.
4-2-3-1 vs. 3-4-3
I’m a 3-4-3 man myself.
The Selecao and the Azzurri have a proud history of producing outstanding strikers and extravagantly gifted No.10s respectively, but the production lines have ground to a halt
[FONT=RobotoMedium][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]ANALYSIS[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]By Mark Doyle & Tom Webber | Italy & Brazil Experts[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]When Brazil faced Italy in the 1970 World Cup, Pele led the line for the [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Selecao[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial], while the [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Azzurri[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] could afford to leave the great Gianni Rivera on the bench as they had the equally gifted Sandro Mazzola to fulfil the role of [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartista[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]. On Saturday afternoon, the two sides will meet in the Confederations Cup. Brazil will start with Fred as their central striker, while Italy, embarrassingly devoid of a classic No.10, will probably deploy Antonio Candreva and Stephan El Shaarawy in behind lone forward Mario Balotelli. What a sad state of affairs.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]For years, this most illustrious of fixtures was almost guaranteed to feature an outstanding Brazilian centre-forward and an extravagantly gifted Italian [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartista[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]. However, after Zizinho, Vava, Pele, Careca, Romario and Ronaldo, we now have the fittingly mundanely-named Fred - a competent but unspectacular striker. Meanwhile, the proud history of the Italian [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartista[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] has not just been tarnished, it has been consigned to the past. We’ve gone from Rivera, Mazzola, Giancarlo Antognoni, Giuseppe Giannini and Francesco Totti to … well, nothing.[/FONT][/SIZE]
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[RIGHT][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial][CENTER]ITALY’S TREQUARTISTAS OPTIONS[/CENTER]
[CENTER] PLAYER[/CENTER] [CENTER]INTL APPS[/CENTER] [CENTER]INTL GOALS[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Aquilani[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]27[/CENTER] [CENTER]4[/CENTER]
[CENTER][B]Candreva[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]8[/CENTER] [CENTER]0[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Diamanti[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]12[/CENTER] [CENTER]0[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Giaccherini[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]11[/CENTER] [CENTER]1[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Marchisio[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]36[/CENTER] [CENTER]2[/CENTER]
[CENTER][B]Montolivo[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]47[/CENTER] [CENTER]2[/CENTER][/FONT][/SIZE][/RIGHT]
[FONT=RobotoMedium][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Simply put, Italy is no longer in possession of a classic No.10. Of course, there is an explanation for the country’s proud production line of playmakers grinding to a halt: there is no longer any room for such a player in the modern game. [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Trequartistas[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] have always played the game at their own laconic pace. [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]They slow the game down while the game has done nothing but speed up over the past 30 years. In short, [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartistas[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] have become redundant. No modern team can afford to accommodate a player who doesn’t tackle; who doesn’t track back. Every player must work hard - even the striker, with Bayern Munich forward Mario Mandzukic a fantastic case in point. The Croat embodies the concept of defending from the front.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Consequently, [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartistas[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] are a dying breed. Andrea Pirlo is a throwback to a different age but even he had to adapt. The [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Azzurri[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] ace began his footballing life as a classic No.10 but it was only after being converted into a deep-lying playmaker that he began to thrive. It had to be so; there would have been no other way for such a talent to excel in the modern game. [/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Nowadays, coaches are no longer willing to build their sides around players of Pirlo’s ilk. Former Argentina playmaker Juan Roman Riquelme is a case in point. He was one of the most divisive players of his generation: revered by the purists but rejected by the pragmatists. Louis van Gaal had no use for him at Barcelona but Riquelme was a revelation in a Villarreal team constructed around him.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Luciano Spalletti, meanwhile, famously had to select a side without any strikers in order to make the most of Francesco Totti’s considerable abilities. That was a revolutionary move, but it did not catch on. Players today must have a work ethic to match their talent, as so perfectly embodied by both Barcelona and Bayern Munich. They are, quite sensibly, driven by the fear that hard work can triumph over talent when talent doesn’t work hard.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Of course, [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartistas[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] have always been viewed with suspicion, even during their heyday, in the 1960s. The legendary Italian journalist Gianni Brera labelled Rivera an [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]abatino[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] (young priest). The implication was that the AC Milan legend was weak, a luxury player. It was a tag that dogged Rivera, arguably the greatest of all [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequaristas[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial], for the duration of his career. [/FONT][/SIZE]
[/FONT]
[RIGHT][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial][CENTER]BRAZIL’S STRIKING OPTIONS[/CENTER]
[CENTER] PLAYER[/CENTER] [CENTER]INTL APPS[/CENTER] [CENTER]INTL GOALS[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Fred[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]26[/CENTER] [CENTER]11[/CENTER]
[CENTER][B]Damiao[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]17[/CENTER] [CENTER]3[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Jo[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]6[/CENTER] [CENTER]2[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Pato[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]24[/CENTER] [CENTER]9[/CENTER]
[CENTER] [B]Fabiano[/B][/CENTER] [CENTER]45[/CENTER] [CENTER]23[/CENTER][/FONT][/SIZE][/RIGHT]
[FONT=RobotoMedium][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Brera, also a stern critic of Mazzola, would therefore be delighted that the role has now all but disappeared. And yet Italy are currently crying out for a new [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartista[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]. [/FONT][/SIZE][I][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]
Azzurri[/FONT][/SIZE][/I][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial] boss Cesare Prandelli has tried Riccardo Montolivo and Claudio Marchisio in the position, but to no great success. The cold, harsh truth is that there is no ‘new Totti’. And potentially never will be.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Still, at least Brazil could yet produce another Ronaldo. Indeed, Adriano looked like [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]o Fenomeno[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]’s heir but his personal problems got the better of him. However, nobody has stepped up to fill the void in the interim.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Admittedly, Brazil are presently deprived of Leandro Damiao through injury, but he is not that much of an improvement upon either Fred or Jo. These forwards score goals, but they do not take the breath away, like Romario and Ronaldo did with such regularity in their heyday.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Part of the problem is that in the Brasileirao the most popular formation is the 4-2-2-2. This maximises space and cover for marauding full-backs, which are so prevalent in Brazil. For them to be effective in advanced wide areas they need something to aim at inside the area. Consequently, centre-forwards are more likely to be adept at heading and hold-up play than dribbling, with Neymar a pleasing anomaly. However, in the modern era, players like Neymar, Cristiano Ronaldo and Lionel Messi, are predominantly used as ‘false nines’ or wingers-cum-forwards.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]The consequential lack of gifted out-and-out centre-forwards even prompted former Brazil boss Mano Menezes to experiment with 4-6-0 formation towards the end of his reign. [/FONT][/SIZE]
[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]There are those that blame a change in youth development for the lack of stellar strikers, while others believe that this is simply a phase - just like in 1982, when Brazil turned up for the World Cup in Spain with a plethora of playmakers but without an outstanding centre forward. [/FONT][/SIZE]
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[SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]Whatever the reason, it seems unthinkable that Brazil will never again produce a strike capable of doing it all. Italy, though, may never again produce a true [/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]trequartista[/FONT][/SIZE][SIZE=13px][FONT=Arial]. The game simply won’t allow it.[/FONT][/SIZE]
[FONT=georgia][SIZE=3]Really good article from goal.com (surprisingly).[/SIZE][/FONT]
I see we are seeing a resurgence in the use of 4-4-2. Looks as though Trap was well ahead of the curve on that
Liverpool played a 3-5-2 yesterday with Henderson and Enrique acting as wing backs- Johnson will excel in that role, but the problem for Liverpool at the moment is the centre mid. Gerrard and Lucas are very slow and have looked very leggy in all our second half performances. The ball takes an age to get to the forwards through the centre and it’s clear as day an athletic CM is needed.
Not sue an athletic Chocolate Mice would be worth a shite to be honest.
Like Jonjo Shelvey?
I would have loved for it to have worked out but right now he is too headless and goes missing in games. I think if he gets his temperament under control he will be a good player.
3-4-3 is a beautiful formation.
Interesting free kick with fake wall from Milan.
I thought it was interesting that both Burnley and QPR were undone by defensive errors at the weekend. Both teams giving the ball away in their own halves and not being able to funnel back into those two banks of four that blight the modern game. Arsenal and Chelsea hardly laid a glove on them otherwise.
Zidane’s half time speech from the Champions League final last season. Nothing earth shattering in it but rare enough to get to see one of these.
That’s an interesting insight. Is it from a longer piece of film?
Analysis based on yesteryear is pointless in game that has changed unrecognisably
Article image
KEN EARLY
When Liverpool scored after 15 seconds against Huddersfield Town on Friday night, one common reaction would have been to bemoan the lack of competitiveness in the Premier League, and wonder if there was anything else on television. But this was one of the most interesting goals you’ll see all season, and it’s worth analysing what happened in detail.
From the kick-off, Huddersfield go back to holding midfielder Jon Gorenc Stankovic, who plays it right to central defender Colin Schindler. Daniel Sturridge closes Schindler down, and Sadio Mane is close to the right back Tommy Smith, so Schindler plays it back to goalkeeper Jonas Lössl and runs towards the right corner of the Huddersfield box to make himself available for a return pass.
Except Sturridge has angled his run to close down Lössl such that he is also threatening that return pass to Schindler, and he has Mane in support. The other centre half, Terence Kongolo, has split to the left corner of the Huddersfield box, but Mohamed Salah is close by: too risky. The easiest available pass is up the middle to Stankovic, who is unmarked and appears to be in space.
Appearances can be deceptive. Naby Keïta is a good 15 yards away from Stankovic, on the far side of another Huddersfield midfielder, Jonathan Hogg. Hogg is pointing and gesticulating to team-mates and paying no attention to Keïta, whose orientation at this moment seems to be entirely defensive.
In fact Keïta is waiting to spring the trap. As the ball goes back to Lössl, he knows his team-mates are leaving the goalkeeper with only two options: hit it long, or pass to Stankovic in the middle. At the precise instant he sees Lössl has chosen the short rather than the long pass, Keïta takes off, goes past Hogg before Hogg realises what is happening, and arrives on Stankovic’s blindside as he turns with the ball and attempts to pass. Keïta blocks the ball to the nearby Salah, runs into the area, collects the return pass and scores.
The interesting thing about the goal was that you’d never have seen one like it in the Premier League of 10 years ago. These 15 seconds showed some of the ways the game has changed.
First, Huddersfield were trying to play the ball out from the back, rather than simply humping it into Liverpool’s half. This mightn’t seem like a very clever idea for a team like Huddersfield: maybe they’d be better off playing long ball rather than trying to be some kind of sad cargo-cult Barcelona. Sure, if Lössl had just launched it they wouldn’t have conceded this particular goal. But would they have been any more successful over the course of the season? Cardiff have been true to the old-school approach, and it hasn’t done them much good.
Huddersfield would have got away with that opening sequence against most teams. This time they were destroyed by the superb organisation of Liverpool’s press – most obviously the timing of Keïta’s burst forward into the challenge, but also the angle Sturridge chose to cut off, the positioning of Salah and Mane. It was a team goal to which four players contributed, and two of them didn’t even touch the ball.
This is what top-level football is about now – team moves so rapid and automatic you have to watch it back several times to figure out what just happened.
More collective
The game is more collective than ever, yet the players are still judged and criticised as individuals. Look at Sky’s coverage of the Manchester derby last week. The senior analysts were Roy Keane, who was the best midfielder in the league 20 years ago, and Graeme Souness, who was the best midfielder in the league 20 years before that.At one point, Keane lost patience with Gary Neville’s reluctance to condemn United defenders Luke Shaw and Matteo Darmian for their actions on the City goals.
“It’s two yards! At least close him down . . . if the guy gets a shot off no problem, get out to him! Like your life depends on it! . . . Gary, you’re on about the runners. There’s an obsession about players – oh there’s people running – but the ball’s . . . that’s the danger! There’s no runner there, the ball’s just, there’s only one ball, close it down! Don’t worry what’s going on over there or over there, close the ball down! That’s the basics!”
Keane’s scorn is always intensely watchable and the clip of this exchange has since had more than a million views on YouTube. And you might find yourself nodding along – why didn’t Shaw make a challenge, why couldn’t Darmian get a bit closer to Leroy Sané? Why won’t these young men tackle and put their bodies on the line, like they did in the good old days?
You’d almost forget that these were City’s 156th and 157th goals of the season – an all-time record in English football. How do they seem to find it so very easy to score? Is it because most of their opponents are cheats and bluffers, so rotten from too much money and first-class travel and Dr Dre headphones that they have forgotten or stopped caring about the basics of football?
Or might it have something to do with what City are doing? Their game is about systematically presenting the opponent with a bad choice, and a worse choice. Which is it going to be?
You are Luke Shaw and Bernardo Silva is coming at you on the edge of the box. Do you challenge him and risk getting dribbled or maybe conceding a penalty, or do you stand off and risk him shooting past you? You decide that David de Gea will probably have the shot covered and . . . congratulations it is 1-0 to City and you are already trending on Twitter, and not in a good way.
You are Matteo Darmian and Raheem Sterling is bearing down on your defensive line while Sergio Agüero makes a run in between you and Chris Smalling. Do you follow Agüero’s run and leave space for the advancing Sané, or do you guard the space and let Sterling play Agüero in for a one-on-one? You decide to go with Agüero, then you have to backpedal when Sterling passes to Sané and . . . congratulations, it is 2-0 to City and you are about to have your manhood questioned on live television by the world’s funniest, angriest football pundit.
More elusive
There is a seductive simplicity about the notion that it’s all about character and desire: desire to get to the ball, to make the tackle, to block the shot. But this ignores how the game has changed over the last few years. There’s still only one ball – but that ball is a lot more elusive than it was in Roy Keane’s day.
If you want to understand the evolution of the sport, look at some historical comparisons. Over the last 10 years, the number of passes in the Premier League has increased by more than 25 per cent. In 2007-8, teams passed the ball 358 times per game on average. In 2017-18, the average was 453 – nearly 100 passes more per game, per team.
The trend towards more passes is magnified at the top end. Arsenal were the top passers in 2007-8, averaging 495 passes per game. Last season, Manchester City’s average was 743: a full 50 per cent more than the best passing team of 10 years ago!
How do you get close to the ball when it’s moving that fast? You can do what Keane urged the United players to do, “ignore the runners” and “not worry about what’s going on over there and over there”, focus on the ball and try to “get to it, like your life depends on it” – but if you press and your team-mates don’t, then City will pass it around you and make you look foolish, and after chasing them for an hour you will find you can hardly move your legs. And that’s when they’ll start running up the score. Against City you either press as a team, or not at all; against a system like this the individual is powerless.
The rise of system football means that the English league today has less broken play, and more periods of controlled possession. In 2008, Premier League teams averaged almost 24 tackles per game. By 2017-18 the average number of tackles had dropped by almost a third, to just over 16 per game. Huddersfield Town topped the tackle table in 2017-18, with 744.
The team with the lowest number of tackles in 2008 was Reading, with 800 – so the team that made the fewest tackles 10 years ago tackled more than the team that makes the most tackles today. Interceptions have also declined, by about one-sixth. Less broken play means fewer chances for individuals to seize the moment and be the hero.
Another evolution involves crossing and the players who do it. If you compare crossing statistics from 2007-8 and this season, you notice two big changes. First, the overall numbers are down. The top 20 crossers in 2008 averaged 6.5 crosses per game, whereas in 2018-19 this group is down to 4.5 crosses per game – a drop of nearly one-third. Today’s teams don’t like giving the ball away with hit-and-hope crosses.
Second, it’s a different type of player doing the crossing. The 2008 top crossers list was made up of wingers and midfielders – names like David Bentley, Stewart Downing, Ashley Young (who was a winger back then), etc. There is only one full back in the top 20: Nicky Shorey, then of Reading. In 2018-19, eight of the top 20 crossers are full backs, with Everton’s Lucas Digne leading the way, and Jose Holebas, Kieran Trippier, Trent Alexander-Arnold and (converted full back) Ashley Young also in the top 10.
Possession
If you want full backs to cross a lot then you had better hold possession long enough to give them time to get into the opposition third. That’s one reason why, 20 years ago, full backs seldom crossed the halfway line – the other being that few players were fit enough to keep running the length of the pitch for 90 minutes. Even in 2008, defensive full backs were the norm and a player like Dani Alves – who invented the template for the modern attacking full back – still seemed like he’d been beamed back from the future.
For the state of the art in 2018-19, look at Liverpool. Andy Robertson and Trent Alexander-Arnold are two of the most dangerous old-school wingers in the Premier League – which is to say, players who set up goals for team-mates by crossing from high positions. Robertson’s 11 assists are already a new Premier League record for a defender; Alexander-Arnold has nine so he too could easily match the old record of 10 this season.
The only “true” wingers with comparable assist numbers are Sané and Ryan Fraser. Robertson and Alexander-Arnold have done this while simultaneously being part of the meanest defence in the division. Moreover, despite playing with two full backs who operate as wingers and in theory leave huge spaces behind to be exploited, Liverpool have yet to concede a single goal on the counterattack in the Premier League all season.
The level of tactical organisation required to pull this off is phenomenal. It underlines the reality that football is less and less a battle between individuals, and more and more a contest of systems. At some point maybe the ex-pros who analyse the game on television will understand this and stop judging players by the standards of a sport that no longer exists.
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Some truth to that but also a fair bit of bollox. A bit of a journalist dying to show he knows more about the game than some ex pros. Keane was still right. United players have often been lazy in their tracking this season. No system can guard against that.
yeah I think there is a point where you have to close in and make the tackle and a time where you sit back and zonal defend watching the ball and the runs off the ball. You have to make the tackle on the edge of the box, that is the immediate goal scoring threat. You dont need to make that same tackle if the ball is on the half way line.