A tough little fucker.
Jules has retired.
He threw a few touchdowns as well I think
James Conner to the Cards.
Well he’s a tough runner so he hits the sort of lines that are left by Kenyan Drake.
I see that he’s currently having surgery for a “toe injury suffered while driving a recreational vehicle in the off-season” - that’s a load of BS, he sounds like a crock.
Is there any chance the Steelers would draft a RB first round or would that just be mad? Snell isn’t great. I see they took on Kalen Ballage.
Snell is a geebag.
2 Likes
Not a great RB. He’d have to be nearly the worst first-choice RB in the league.
I wouldn’t be one bit surprised if they took Harris if he fell to 24.
They couldnt move the ball 5 yards on the ground down the home stretch, it really fucked them… that and their coach.
Paranoia, mismanagement and office politics: Inside the Eagles’ downfall under Jeffrey Lurie, Howie Roseman
Sheil Kapadia, Bo Wulf and Zach Berman Apr 12, 2021
449 
Four weeks into the 2019 season, Doug Pederson sat down for his scheduled inquisition.
The Tuesday tribunals with team owner Jeffrey Lurie and general manager Howie Roseman were a weekly occurrence during Pederson’s five-year tenure as Eagles head coach. In the meetings, Lurie and Roseman questioned Pederson about all aspects of his game management the week prior. Fourth-down decision-making, play calling, personnel choices — everything was on the table.
Days earlier, the team overcame a 10-0 second-quarter deficit to beat Aaron Rodgers and the Packers 34-27 and even its record at 2-2. The offensive key to the win was a steady dose of the running game that took advantage of Green Bay’s defensive game plan.
Apparently, that wasn’t good enough. Lurie, who has long advocated the use of analytics, wanted to know why Pederson hadn’t called more passing plays. The interrogation was the same after another win that season — this time in Buffalo on a day with 23 mph winds.
“(Pederson) was ridiculed and criticized for every decision,” one source told The Athletic . “If you won by three, it wasn’t enough. If you lost on a last-second field goal, you’re the worst coach in history.”
Following the season, Lurie wanted Pederson to get rid of offensive coordinator Mike Groh and wide receivers coach Carson Walch. It wasn’t the first time Pederson found himself on the opposite end of a disagreement with his bosses over his assistant coaches.
After Pederson’s first year as head coach in 2016, he fought to keep then-offensive coordinator Frank Reich, pushing back against doubts from above. Pederson put his foot down again with Groh and Walch, saying he wanted both coaches to return.
That’s when Lurie reminded the coach who makes the final calls at the NovaCare Complex.
Pederson was given 24 hours to make the moves, according to multiple sources. If he didn’t, he’d be fired.
A source close to Lurie says the owner never gave Pederson an ultimatum, but the next day the Eagles announced Groh and Walch had been let go. A year later it was Pederson, who declined comment for this story. Lurie and Roseman also declined to participate in this story through a team spokesperson.
Three years after the Eagles captured the first Super Bowl in franchise history, the team finished in last place in the worst division in football. Pederson is currently out of the NFL. Former franchise quarterback Carson Wentz is in Indianapolis. Lurie is more involved in all aspects of football operations than ever before and has kept Roseman by his side to usher in a new era with head coach Nick Sirianni, the fourth head coach in the GM’s tenure.
Over the past two months, The Athletic spoke to current and former Eagles staffers representing a cross-section of departments and viewpoints about the inner workings of the franchise. They were granted anonymity to be allowed to speak freely about sensitive topics, describing an environment characterized by second-guessing, paranoia and a lack of transparency.
According to Lurie, Roseman’s role is to foster a culture of collaboration between different departments, but the philosophical lockstep the Eagles emanated in the wake of their Super Bowl triumph was far from the truth. Tension simmered behind the scenes among different factions of football operations. Over the ensuing few years, the animosity festered to the point that certain departments were separated inside the building.
“The fact that Doug had the success he did with all the shit going on in the building, sometimes I look at our Super Bowl rings, and I’m like, ‘Holy cow, I don’t know how we did it,’” one source said.
In fact, the championship season began with many in the building wondering whether Pederson would even last the year.
In the days leading up to the 2017 opener, word of a three-hour meeting between Lurie and defensive coordinator Jim Schwartz spread throughout the organization. The specifics were unknown, but multiple sources said there was a feeling around the team that Lurie was vetting an in-house replacement for Pederson in the event the Eagles got off to a slow start.
After a Week 1 victory in Washington, the team celebrated by dumping Gatorade on Pederson’s head. Philadelphia went on to win 10 of its first 11 games. But Pederson didn’t just have to prove himself on Sundays.
Over time, the Tuesday meetings wore on Pederson. Lurie has long considered the organization at the forefront of innovation, and the impression among Pederson’s supporters in the building was that Lurie’s weekly questions were largely based on postgame reports produced by the team’s analytics staff.
Sources say Pederson was beaten down by the constant second-guessing. “They treated him like a baby,” one said.
Alec Halaby, the Eagles’ vice president of football operations and strategy, has worked under Roseman since joining the team full time in 2010 and now runs the team’s four-person analytics department. The young executive with an Ivy League pedigree carries with him the kind of reputation that causes football lifers to scoff. And according to multiple sources, a rift grew between Halaby and some members of the coaching staff and scouting department.
“Within the building, he’s perceived as Howie’s guy,” said one source. “That’s a problem. … No coach wants somebody around who they think is undermining the perception of how well they’re doing.”
To some, Halaby is something of an interloper. They say he carries influence with Lurie in part because of a close relationship with fellow Harvard grad Julian Lurie, Jeffrey’s son, who stands to one day take over the family business. To others, Halaby is “brilliant” and simply willing to fight for what he believes is right. The more nuanced opinion is that Halaby is in a “no-win situation,” boxed into a specific characterization by the non-traditional football background he shares with Roseman and a personality that makes him a “square peg in a round hole.”
The blurriness of Halaby’s influence on the final decision-makers created rifts throughout the organization and contributed to the iciness between departments. One source described the analytics team as a “clandestine, Black Ops department that doesn’t answer to anybody except the owner,” even though Halaby officially reports to Roseman.
During the 2017 season, Halaby’s and Pederson’s relationship soured to the point where Pederson berated Halaby within earshot of the rest of the office, according to sources. In the opinion of some members of the coaching staff, Halaby was not to be trusted.
Frustration mounted on the scouting side as well. Rather than being presented with reasons for where certain draft-eligible players were rated by Halaby’s department, the scouting staff would simply be given a list of players the analytics department liked. According to one source, a top personnel official was upset to find out Halaby was grading players on his own despite never having been trained in the scouting department’s methodology.
Lurie’s investment in analytics is substantial. In addition to Halaby’s staff, the owner brought in Warren Sharp of SharpFootballAnalysis.com, who provides a weekly offensive game plan report during the season.
When Andrew Berry was hired by Roseman to be the Eagles’ VP of football operations in 2019, there was an expectation by some in the building he was brought in to help bridge the divide between the football side and the analytics department. But while Berry remains a popular figure in the organization and was described by one source as “the nicest guy in the world,” the damage between departments was already done. The interoffice dynamics were no more harmonious when Berry left to become the Browns general manager in 2020 than when he arrived.
Before the 2018 draft, the Eagles installed a state-of-the-art draft room across the building from what is traditionally considered the “football” side of the building, where the coaching staff and scouting department sit. One year later, Halaby’s department was moved from the football side of the building to an alcove near the new draft room. Though Halaby maintained his influence, the symbolism of Roseman banishing an entire department to “the other side of the building” was not lost on those who watched Roseman undergo the same move three years prior, when Lurie had cast him aside in favor of Chip Kelly.
Shortly after Lurie bought the team from Norman Braman in 1994, Sports Illustrated’s Peter King wrote, “Hollywood producer Jeffrey Lurie is a member of that most rabid subspecies of NFL fanatic, the draftaholic. In recent years he has prepared for the league’s annual college draft by holing up in the media room above the garage of his Beverly Hills home and watching tapes of the Blue-Gray Game, the Japan Bowl, the Senior Bowl — Lurie would have them all — on his big-screen, surround-sound TV.”
That passion remains strong. According to multiple sources, Lurie devours tape of college prospects and is an “active participant” in the pre-draft process.
Those who have experienced that process acknowledge its murkiness. Often, there’s no explanation given when the team strays from an established draft board. Sometimes, as with J.J. Arcega-Whiteside’s selection in 2019, Lurie puts his thumb on the scale when the team was prepared to make another selection (in that case, Ohio State’s Parris Campbell).
But the virtual nature of the 2020 draft made things even less clear to the majority of the football operations staff. For the most part, last year’s decisions were discussed in a small virtual room consisting of Roseman, Lurie, Pederson and vice president of player personnel Andy Weidl. As a result, each of the Eagles’ first three selections — TCU receiver Jalen Reagor, Oklahoma quarterback Jalen Hurts and Colorado linebacker Davion Taylor — mystified some scouts and coaches watching along at home, just like everybody else.
Roseman has the final say over the roster. Any draft pick, trade or signing — good or bad — is on his record. Yet behind the scenes, there’s lingering ambiguity about how decisions are made. For an organization that publicly touts collaboration as if it’s offering a TED Talk on intraoffice cohesion, the lack of collaboration became a common refrain among those with knowledge of the decision-making process.
Coaches wanted their evaluations taken into account or felt like certain players were forced upon them, scouts didn’t understand why picks didn’t correspond with an established methodology, and other staffers were unsure how their analysis was being applied in decisions. Departments became siloed — or even pitted against each other — and the lack of collaboration made finger-pointing easier.
“Building that coalition and leading that group to work together in a constructive way is not Howie’s strength,” one source said. “In fact, it’s one of his weaknesses.”
Roseman is known to keep his own draft board, and scouts who spend months on the road evaluating players can feel marginalized when the rankings they’ve helped assemble are not followed. One source described Roseman pushing an assistant coach to give playing time to a recent draft pick while the assistant balanced conflicting recommendations from senior members of the coaching staff. Lurie, who regularly attends practice, inquired about a reserve’s playing time. There’s been confusion about why certain players were active and others were inactive on game days, with speculation centered on Roseman’s outsized influence on the game-day roster.
“Those are the types (of things) that happened where there’s no collaboration,” another source said.
Hall of Famer Brian Dawkins, who worked in the front office from 2016 to 2018, once delivered an impassioned speech in the team’s draft room to a group of employees in football operations. For those who had never seen that side of Dawkins up close, it was a stirring experience. With trademark intensity, the franchise icon spoke about his passion for the organization and addressed an office culture he said needed more teamwork, less in-fighting.
In other words, a house divided against itself cannot stand.
No one in the organization has drawn more fan ire this offseason than Roseman. After all, if the head coach and quarterback who led the team to a Super Bowl three years ago can both be jettisoned so quickly, why does the man responsible for hiring and acquiring both get to stick around?
“To think, three years later, the head coach, your starting quarterback who was 2017 MVP-caliber, the guy who won you the Super Bowl and damn near every coach who was on staff isn’t there, you have to think, ‘What happened?’” one source said.
According to multiple sources, the answer is that Roseman has made himself “essential” to Lurie. “This is a survivor,” said one source about Roseman. “This is someone who understands how to stay close with the most important person in the building.”
Originally hired as an intern to help with salary-cap issues in 2000, Roseman worked his way up the ladder for a decade until becoming GM as a 35-year-old in 2010. When he and Kelly famously butted heads, Lurie banished Roseman to the non-football side of the NovaCare Complex and handed the reins of roster control over to Kelly. After Lurie fired Kelly the following season, Roseman returned to power, chastened by the experience. He orchestrated a series of moves to draft Wentz and fortified what turned out to be a Super Bowl roster — then oversaw that roster’s demise.
Through it all, Roseman has overcome doubts about his football bona fides to become one of the most powerful executives in the league, a de facto CEO who answers only to Lurie.
Those close to Roseman believe he was sincere in his effort to improve his interpersonal skills in the wake of his expulsion. He talks often about carrying with him the lessons from that time. But over the course of the past few years, as the team’s success waned, sources say some of Roseman’s worst instincts have returned.
“My best analogy of that would be when people lose weight and there’s the boomerang effect,” said one source. “They lose a lot of weight and then they gain it all back and then some. That’s how I would describe that.”
At the heart of Roseman’s weaknesses is an obsession with the way he’s portrayed, and that plays into his management style. Rather than foster collaborative group conversation, he prefers to discuss most decisions in separate one-on-one conversations with stakeholders throughout the building. That’s not necessarily a knock. “He’s an outstanding one-on-one communicator,” said one source.
But those on all levels of football operations find themselves caught off guard by transactions that contradict what the larger group understood to be the plan. The perception is Roseman can’t help himself from making the splashy move when patience is required.
Roseman is also thought by some to be too friendly with his favorite players. He has publicly acknowledged his sentimentality for the Super Bowl roster as a flaw in recent years, but that closeness extends beyond what turned out to be bad football decisions. Wentz and defensive tackle Fletcher Cox, for instance, held outsized sway over certain roster and coaching staff decisions, according to multiple sources.
Perhaps the most combustible way in which Roseman’s image consciousness plays itself out in the building is his paranoia about information leaks. There are horror stories across departments of Roseman scolding employees and threatening to search phones in reaction to the publication of inside information. On at least one occasion, according to a source, Roseman tasked an employee with combing through phone records in search of a leak’s origin. But the understanding in the building is that this particular Roseman anxiety is not principally over concern about the information getting out. Rather, he prefers to be the one to disseminate the information when and where he sees fit. In his view, information is currency.
Roseman is not without his defenders. He is described as “loyal to his guys” and willing to let those he trusts handle their jobs without meddling. Roseman has told a story about learning from Andy Reid the importance of putting on a positive front in the face of setbacks, which he has taken to heart. In the midst of a 4-11-1 season, Roseman maintained his rah-rah attitude in the building. Even his survival instincts are described with admiration by some.
And, of course, he designed the city’s first Super Bowl roster.
That championship run was delivered within two seasons of Roseman’s return to power. It was led on the field by Roseman and Lurie’s hand-picked coach and executed by a roster that featured only two players acquired during Kelly’s tenure in charge of personnel. Roseman and Lurie believed they deserved even more input, even if the constant second-guessing wore on Pederson.
Lurie pushes for the implementation of progressive, analytically supported ideas. His urgency to litigate every Pederson decision was also proof of his growing involvement in football operations. The Tuesday meetings, for instance, never took place during Andy Reid’s 14-year tenure in Philadelphia.
In the context of his peers, Lurie is a rare bird. Unlike some owners, the team is his top business and personal interest. He attends most practices during the season and has traveled to private workouts and Senior Bowls in years past. If Roseman, a master at managing up, invites Lurie’s input, what guardrails remain to prevent the owner from being too involved?
Even those who bristle at some of Lurie’s involvement call him a “good man” whose motives are sincere. “He loves football and wants to win,” said one source.
His main weakness, in the eyes of some, is his loyalty to Roseman, whom Lurie views as a friend. Nearly 30 years into his ownership of the team, having already achieved Super Bowl glory, perhaps Lurie has decided to be more involved and push forward with those he trusts.
When Lurie and Roseman decided to trade Wentz this offseason, they acknowledged the move reflected an organizational failure. In January, Roseman described Wentz as being like one of the fingers on his hand. “You can’t even imagine that they are not part of you,” Roseman said.
Nobody in the organization could’ve seen Wentz’s 2020 disaster coming, and nobody has a great explanation for why he performed like one of the NFL’s worst starting quarterbacks. Some pointed to his supporting cast and the injuries on the offensive line. Others said it was a coaching staff that ran out of ideas to help him.
And then there’s the Jalen Hurts theory. The Eagles’ decision to select Hurts in the second round last April caught many in the organization by surprise. When explaining the pick, Roseman said the Eagles wanted to be a “quarterback factory,” a comment he now wishes he could have back. Roseman thought he could snag a competent backup quarterback with upside at a low cost, and Lurie was all for the move. What they both underestimated was how the young players on the roster, particularly those who didn’t have a history with Wentz, would gravitate toward Hurts.
Some in the organization thought it shouldn’t have been an issue. Wentz had received a $128 million contract extension from the team, and in the eyes of some, Lurie and Roseman had coddled him throughout his tenure.
On the other hand, Wentz had experienced a turbulent four seasons in Philadelphia. Nick Foles led the team on its Super Bowl run in 2017 and to the divisional round of the playoffs the following year after Wentz suffered a pair of successive season-ending injuries. In 2019, Wentz suffered a concussion in the first quarter of the only playoff game he’s appeared in. In between it all, there were anonymous leaks suggesting that Wentz needed to do a better job connecting with teammates.
Multiple sources said the loss of Reich after 2017 played a role in Wentz’s regression. It wasn’t just that Reich had a connection with Wentz. One source described him as Pederson’s glue, a supportive right-hand man who served as a valuable intermediary.
The relationship between head coach and quarterback deteriorated as things went south in 2020. One source described Wentz as smarter than most of the coaches on staff, but that meant he wanted to control the game at the line of scrimmage with checks and audibles. His pre-snap orchestrations led to confusion among the other players and resulted in guys not being on the same page. Pederson struggled to find a balance between empowering Wentz and reining him in.
The overall issues in 2020 were exacerbated by a series of personnel misses. Roseman has admitted that he thought the Eagles had a Super Bowl window as justification for giving up draft picks to acquire players like Golden Tate, Genard Avery and Darius Slay. As a result of his overall philosophy, the organization made just 10 total picks in 2018 and 2019.
The Eagles traded up in the first round for tackle Andre Dillard in 2019, and he has started just four games in two seasons. Arcega-Whiteside has just 254 receiving yards in two seasons. It’s too soon to judge Reagor, but it will be impossible to discuss his career without acknowledging the Eagles took him one spot ahead of Minnesota’s Justin Jefferson, who already looks like a star.
Meanwhile, Roseman leaned on contract restructures with veterans to free up immediate cap space. The old, expensive team, combined with the draft misses, played a large role in last year’s disaster and the current state of the roster.
In the end, 2020 was bad enough that Lurie would have been justified in moving on from Pederson, Wentz and Roseman. But he opted for just two of the three.
Lurie is fond of Pederson on a personal level but was frustrated by the offensive failures and Pederson’s decisions with his coaching staff. Wentz wanted a fresh start, but if the Eagles believed strongly that he could fix his flaws and get them back to the Super Bowl, they had enough leverage to keep him. Instead, they decided to maximize draft compensation while it was still on the table and get their cap in order for 2022 and beyond.
The sense is that they’ll give Hurts a shot in 2021 — a decision that one source said was largely being pushed by Lurie — and revisit the quarterback position after the season. Even when they mapped out their worst-case scenarios, this is not where they expected to be.
The Eagles effectively tanked the final game of the 2020 regular season, but the expectation immediately after the loss was that Pederson would return for his sixth season. He survived “Black Monday” and fulfilled his end-of-season duties. All that awaited was a meeting with Lurie.
But one discussion was not enough. Much like the end of the 2019 season, there were disagreements about Pederson’s staff that stretched into a follow-up meeting. That’s when the Eagles made the change.
Lurie called it a “difference in vision,” as the owner was focused on “the mid term and long term and not on how to maximize 2021,” while Pederson wanted to retain familiar coaches who could allow for a “smoother 2021” season. Even Lurie acknowledged that Pederson “did not deserve to be let go,” but it became clear that the Eagles would need a different voice for what the owner termed a “transition period” with the roster.
When Lurie held a video news conference in January to explain Pederson’s firing, he fielded multiple questions about his evaluation of Roseman: Why was the coach dismissed, but not the general manager? Lurie seemed almost incredulous that Roseman was a subject of intrigue.
A week later than other teams with coaching vacancies, Lurie kicked off a search that started with 25 candidates and was pared down to 10 for interviews. Sirianni was not considered a front-runner for the job at the outset. He didn’t interview elsewhere in 2021 and was not among the initial wave of interviewees.
In the phone call offering Sirianni the job, Lurie stated that he was “so incredibly excited for the coach you are and the coach you can become.” An outside perception lingers that Sirianni offered the Eagles a coach of least resistance for management’s involvement. The same was said about Pederson five years ago.
The Eagles enter the 2021 offseason program with fewer familiar faces. For a growing number of employees at the NovaCare Complex, the Lombardi Trophy is more a vestige of a previous era than a shared memory.
“The surprise factor (is) that it happened so quickly,” one source said. “Perhaps it’s not surprising given the culture of the organization.”
But others presented the idea that the drop-off wasn’t dramatic. Perhaps the Super Bowl season was actually the outlier.
There’s also the thought that even passable quarterback play would have obscured some of the problems that appeared glaring in the absence of it. If Wentz was merely a mediocre quarterback last season and the Eagles were merely a mediocre team, there would be less blame required.
Lurie keeps a handwritten checklist in the top drawer next to his bed with the tenets he believes are necessary for a successful organization. Among them are a dynamic head coach, a franchise quarterback and an innovative personnel executive. Roseman is the only one in the triumvirate who remains from the Super Bowl campaign. As he begins his fourth partnership with a head coach, Roseman’s survival instincts are thus far unmatched.
In January 2016, when the Eagles hired Pederson, a question was posed to Pederson and Lurie in the introductory news conference asking for clarity about who possessed final say over the roster.
“I know this,” said Pederson. “It’s a collaborative effort.”
And who breaks the tie?
Lurie, standing a few feet to Pederson’s right, raised his hand. Laughter filled the auditorium
5 Likes
Can you imagine Mr Kraft telling Bill to fire his wr coach or why aren’t you passing the ball more after winning their first sb?
I think the Cardinals are putting together a nice roster under the radar. They are tipping away adding some very good veteran experienced players and have a tidy secondary defence too. They are in a tough division, but I think they will challenge strongly this year. The moves they are making remind me of typical Patriot type additions. Kingsbury is doing a good job, took over a 3-10 team, went 5-10 in his first season and then went 8-8 last year. Taking over a team and also making a rookie QB starter in the first year is a big risk, but they are on a good upward curve. They are taking a shot with AJ Green, he may or may not be a busted flush and Larry Fitzgerald still hasnt been signed, but both of them have big game experience which helps integrate the younger receiving corps with Kyler Murray. And I think Deandre Hopkins is arguably the best receiver in football right now and him and Murray have had a good first season seamlessly getting on the same page.
2 Likes
They were the team I watched most closely last year because Murray was my QB. There are big question marks for Murray this year. He peaked with the Hail Murray and went badly downhill afterwards. I see this as being really his make-or-break year.
Fitzgerald usually only made 1 or 2 catches per game but he worked the slot really intelligently and his absence was notable when he eventually got Covid. They need a slot receiver basically, their TE Arnold is slightly shit, although Murray started to trust him more as the year went on and Kirk and Isabella are both mediocre deep players, just making up the numbers basically. Their big problem is that Murray only really trusts D-Hop so it gets very predictable and easy to defend. AJ Green might change that.
The final issue is that Kingsbury designs cool plays but his game management is often poor. Sometimes at key moments.
Cardinals are going nowhere under Kliff. I’d be shocked if Watt or Green were capable of staying healthy for 17 games and their secondary is fairly mediocre but Kliff it cares about offense.
I think Arnold could be a player if the ball came his way more… They have a slot man, Kirk. He doesnt work outside - they need to bring him back in.
1 Like
Kliff only cares about offense. And fucking.