The Joe Brolly tells porkies thread

A incoherent statement trying to deflect from the sins of the father. And it is straight from the Provos playbook, cynical and self serving.

O toole is a disingenuous bigoted hack who had no interest in getting it right, he was called out. Brolly isn’t ashamed of where he’s from and isn’t afraid to express an opinion…or tribalism as you’d call it.
The fact is brolly has plenty of unionist and protestant friends- genuine ones who know where hes coming from, can fight their own corner and respect a man for being honest- fellow travellers in a post conflict society. He could be a liar and a lackey, that might make him suitable for your company and approval but it wouldn’t make him much of a man.

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He’s talking shite to say people in the Republic of Ireland somehow blamed nationalists because there was disgust at the IRA blowing up children.

John Hume clearly articulated in 1977 that there was no justification for violence. It ultimately achieved nothing and was done as Hume predicted to gain power for its perpetrators and not for any ideal of unity.

Also remember the IRA stated aim was to overthrow the democratically elected government of Republic of Ireland and instal a socialist (unelected) government

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That’s excellent. And he was right to defend the loyalist.

He never said that

And yet you haven’t been able to argue with a single one of his points.

He did say it.

In the clip above he says it. Says orthodoxy developed in South that nationalists were to blame.

That’s just not true. What is true is that IRA campaign was condemned and that’s rightly so.

Whether there was justification for it or not is irrelevant once it becomes inevitable. Get your head round that.

That’s gobbledygook

It’s not inevitable. As the ceasefire eventually proved.

Called out by Brolly doing a bit of gaslighting about southerners?

Is this like you saying the south should have protested to international organisations but not having a clue that they did exactly that?

There are many criticisms of Tin Tin’s work in general but his rebuttal was absolutely pathetic.

The article in question goes across the full breadth of PIRASF atrocities. Are you suggesting someone in the south “doesn’t get the North” when FOT called them out for murdering Irish policemen and soldiers? Did we have to live through Bloody Sunday to have an opinion on that?

Brolly’s argument is the Provo one. Mention an PIRASF atrocity and volley back with civil rights. But that wasn’t the point of their campaign and the 30+ year campaign they conducted. It is a cynical attempt at gaslighting the public and it has worked on plenty.

Nobody has an issue with Northern Catholics, plenty still do with pondlife Provos from the south, the north, England and even the US though.

Catholics in NI lived like kings and queens compared to the blacks in the US or the blacks in apartheid South Africa.

In neither of those cases was there anything remotely resembling a three decades long campaign of murder and terror.

No alternative my hoop.

Which is of course “revisionism” by them.

It has been going on for 25 years in order to justify the campaign.

I made the point on the “lived” experience of Catholics at that time who overwhelmingly rejected violence at the ballot box. At the conclusion of the Troubles polls showed they rejected the violence and any justification for it.

That has swung in the last 25 years as SF have worked hard to plant various seeds in the media.

According to the likes of Halfpipe this is because they are better informed than this “lived” experience. They read the inquiry reports and just are better informed. They’re the same kids who don’t care about the Troubles though, don’t forget. :rofl:

It is amazing they get away with it. They pretend like southerners weren’t aware of Bloody Sunday. The same ones who burnt down the British Embassy in Dublin, had a general strike, a national day of mourning etc. It is the Neo Republican of today who is better informed.

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You don’t get it. Violence has its own logic and energy. There’s little point in trying to rationalise it, measure or predict it. Anger, power, outrage, fear etc can’t be divvied up and moralised over in any useful fashion, except maybe in the minds of fools. Dont dismiss it it as ‘gobbledygook’. Take a few days to think about it.
The ceasefires happened for all sorts of reasons. A military victory wasn’t possible by any of the sides involved, people were sick of it, there was fair employment legislation, the eyes of the world were on the behaviour of the protagonists, the eleven plus had the unforeseen consequences, nationalists had a strong cultural identity due to oppression, thatchers post industrial britain wiped out a protestant working class supremacy, and the demographic was changing catastrophically etc etc etc
But you lads boil it down to good vs bad. You embarrassingly pig ignorant clueless frightened ditch hurlers. You are genuinely pathetic

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I don’t agree with all of this - most specifically the bit about the British supposedly “learning a lesson” from Bloody Sunday - I don’t think that’s true at all - but I do agree with the key point - that the Troubles were created above all by the Provos and their leadership.

Had the Provos not existed, there would have been no Troubles as they played out for three decades.

That terror is Liam Kennedy’s core concern. The question posed by the title of his book—“Who was responsible for the Troubles?”—is intentionally provocative. Some nationalists would no doubt consider it scandalous. How could one side carry the blame for thirty years of killings when IRA and loyalist paramilitaries routinely avenged each other’s acts? At some point it seemed impossible to say just who was responsible; the death spiral became self-perpetuating. Catholics had mobilized for equality, but Protestants claimed this mobilization was itself aggressive. By the early 1970s the volunteers streaming into paramilitaries on both sides believed they were protecting their communities.

Kennedy has been listening to the rival justifications since arriving at Queen’s to teach economic history in 1977. He asks readers to get outside their echo chambers and consider what party may have been primarily responsible for perpetuating the conflict. Violence, he argues, does not happen by “inertia.” The people who blew up crowded pubs or gunned down magistrates at breakfast with their children were not automatons. They thought what they were doing was not only necessary but right.

Kennedy gets to a “prime” culprit by a process of elimination. The police and army were indeed often partisan, but their basic job was containing violence, and if not for the introduction of British troops in 1969, the region might have descended into a full-blown civil war. In any case, these “crown forces” did not drive the violence. “Had there been permanent paramilitary ceasefires at any point from say 1972 onwards,” writes Kennedy, “the British army would have been recalled to barracks.”

What of the denial to Catholics of basic rights from the moment Northern Ireland was founded? Kennedy argues that systemic injustices were being dealt with via reformist policies pursued by British officials from the late 1960s: “Many of the key reforms in housing, local government and voting had been conceded by the time the Provisional IRA went on the offensive.” What of Protestants as agents of violence? According to Kennedy, the unionist side was primarily responsive.

By “Provisional IRA,” Kennedy means the main IRA faction that remained after a split in 1969 (the other faction is called “Official”). After decades of dormancy, the Officials had arisen once more in the late 1960s, setting bombs and killing British soldiers. But in May 1972, after their volunteers murdered Ranger William Best, a nineteen-year-old Catholic on leave in Derry from his unit in Germany, the Officials declared a unilateral cease-fire, worried that the violence would spiral out of control. For Kennedy this proves that continued armed struggle for “Irish rights” was unnecessary: had other republican groups emulated the Official IRA in its radical rethinking of armed struggle, loyalist violence toward the nationalist community would have fizzled out.

Yet rather than retreat, the Provisional IRA (also PIRA or “Provos”) scaled up its campaign of bombings and assassinations. Kennedy thus assigns primary responsibility for the Troubles to a tight-knit Provos leadership group that pressed forward with targeted terrorism into the 1990s, killing more people than all other sources of violence combined.

Critics will ask whether the search for culprits can stop at the PIRA leadership. After all, they did not create themselves, but grew out of generations of official contempt and hypocrisy capped by human-rights abuses during the early 1970s. Anyone who watches documentaries on the Troubles—Arthur MacCaig’s The Patriot Game, for example, or the BBC’s eight-part series Spotlight on the Troubles: A Secret History—will conclude that arrogant officials from Britain, abetted by security forces displaying a colonial mindset, made the emergence of a radical faction in the IRA inevitable. Photojournalists recorded police kicking down doors, violating the elderly, roughing up and arbitrarily arresting young men, and clubbing everyone in sight when entering Catholic areas. After being dragged, sometimes by their hair, into paddy wagons, the arrested were held without trial and subject to abuses condemned as torture by the European Court of Human Rights in 1976.

Kennedy writes that the British learned a lesson from Bloody Sunday: it “was not repeated.” Yes, technically Bloody Sunday was an event of one day, but the images of that event never disappeared from journals and televisions, becoming a perennial call to arms for young men and women—despite desperate efforts of peacemaking clergy and socialist politicians on the nationalist side.

Thus, if Kennedy is right that the violence was propelled by a monstrous coterie of ideological extremists, that monster’s life was made possible by officials located in London, men with impeccable manners and an unquestioned belief in their right to govern supposed inferiors. They took for granted that, for example, the massive internment of Catholics without trial from 1971 to 1975, a “painful decision” arrived at after “due consideration,” would quench the resistance. The effect was the opposite: an unquenchable rage.

By 1972 the Provos seemed to many Catholics the only force speaking a language adequate to their desperation, a fact well documented in Patrick Radden Keefe’s Say Nothing, which tells the story of Dolours Price, an idealistic civil-rights activist from a republican family who was radicalized by direct witness to the persecution of Catholics. After swearing an oath of loyalty to the PIRA, she helped plant car bombs in London in March 1973, wounding some two hundred people. She and her accomplices were apprehended while attempting to board a flight back to Ireland. Decades later it emerged that Price had also belonged to a unit that kidnapped, shot, and buried Jean McConville, a West Belfast Catholic mother of ten who was suspected of treason. McConville’s remains were not located until 2003 in a bog south of the border.

Yet as easy as it is to understand the rage that drove young men and women to the Provos, in retrospect we see that no goal justified their bombings, targeted assassinations, and maimings. Kennedy takes special aim at a central myth promoted by Price and her comrades: that they were protecting Catholics. Only three Catholics had died at loyalist hands between 1966 and 1969, while in the succeeding decades hundreds lost their lives. The Provos proved “hopeless” against their purported enemies: “Less than 2 percent of IRA killings,” Kennedy tells us, “or 28 to be precise were of loyalist paramilitaries.” Moreover, the IRA itself killed Catholics, including its own people. And contrary to the powerful images of Derry in January 1972, only a small minority of the Catholics who died were killed by security forces.

In fact, the Provos’ goals did not lie in immediate self-defense. According to their doctrines, Catholics suffering persecution by the police or unequal treatment were surface problems: peace, justice, and popular welfare were unattainable as long as Ireland remained divided. Thus, the Provos’ operations aimed to drive “British imperialism” from the island. An early leader, London-born John Stephenson (later called Seán Mac Stíofáin), wrote in his memoir, “we believe that only by force of arms can Ireland achieve her complete freedom.” As in any war there would be casualties on both sides, justified by the cause; what the Provos did was exploit mass rage for their own program of national unity. Protestants would either accept united Ireland or get out.

Oh the irony from the poster who was doing exactly that last week.

Read a book. What you know about your home place could be written on the back of a stamp.

You keep on about this reading a book business. I’ll happily accept that you’re extremely well read and very clever.
There.

Violence is carried out by men. It isn’t a force of nature.

Hume called it out in 1977. He was right. The freedom fighters wanted power. That was their goal. That is their goal. They killed more of their own community than the British.

I love when the veil slips.

The Provos should have done simple maths in January 1970. Catholics were outnumbered 65%-35% or more, or whatever it was.

You can’t win by terror in that situation.

Perhaps the blame for the Troubles lies in the teaching of maths in NI schools, or more to the point Republic of Ireland schools, given that a majority of those who founded the Provos were from down here.

It doesn’t matter. Logic didn’t come into it. There was still too much bloodlust, revenge, idealism etc…even thirst for power as you put it. Hume was just one part of it…but unfortunately you can only see one part of it. Your problem, as most of us are moving on.
You find yourself in a bunker … with sid, tim and an empty bookshelf . Best of luck.

You clearly aren’t. Blaming the “south” still. The veil slipped and you’ve shown you are bitter as fuck about it.

I had three great days in Belfast this week. Heard lots of debate and views on how we got to here and how to move forward. Luckily enough nobody blamed the Republic of Ireland like you want to do.